Labor Supply of Politicians

Publikation: Bidrag til tidsskrift › Tidsskriftartikel › Forskning › fagfællebedømt

Standard

Labor Supply of Politicians. / Fisman, Raymond; Harmon, Nikolaj Arpe; Kamenica, Emir; Munk, Inger.

I: Journal of the European Economic Association, Bind 13, Nr. 5, 10.2015, s. 871-905.

Publikation: Bidrag til tidsskrift › Tidsskriftartikel › Forskning › fagfællebedømt

Harvard

Fisman, R, Harmon, NA, Kamenica, E & Munk, I 2015, 'Labor Supply of Politicians', Journal of the European Economic Association, bind 13, nr. 5, s. 871-905. https://doi.org/10.1111/jeea.12141

APA

Fisman, R., Harmon, N. A., Kamenica, E., & Munk, I. (2015). Labor Supply of Politicians. Journal of the European Economic Association, 13(5), 871-905. https://doi.org/10.1111/jeea.12141

Vancouver

Fisman R, Harmon NA, Kamenica E, Munk I. Labor Supply of Politicians. Journal of the European Economic Association. 2015 okt.;13(5):871-905. https://doi.org/10.1111/jeea.12141

Author

Fisman, Raymond ; Harmon, Nikolaj Arpe ; Kamenica, Emir ; Munk, Inger. / Labor Supply of Politicians. I: Journal of the European Economic Association. 2015 ; Bind 13, Nr. 5. s. 871-905.

Bibtex

@article{80e4b01b51a94399867b3248d94225a6,
title = "Labor Supply of Politicians",
abstract = "Using data on Members of the European Parliament (MEPs), we examine the impact of salaries on the composition and the behavior of legislators. Employing a differences-in-differences approach, we exploit the introduction of a law that equalized MEPs{\textquoteright} salaries which had previously differed by as much as a factor of ten. Increasing salaries raises the fraction of MEPs who run for reelection but decreases the quality of elected MEPs (proxied by college quality). Salary has no discernible impact on effort or legislative output. Higher salaries induce more political competition.",
author = "Raymond Fisman and Harmon, {Nikolaj Arpe} and Emir Kamenica and Inger Munk",
note = "Jel Classification: D72;D73",
year = "2015",
month = oct,
doi = "10.1111/jeea.12141",
language = "English",
volume = "13",
pages = "871--905",
journal = "Journal of the European Economic Association",
issn = "1542-4774",
publisher = "Wiley",
number = "5",

}

RIS

TY - JOUR

T1 - Labor Supply of Politicians

AU - Fisman, Raymond

AU - Harmon, Nikolaj Arpe

AU - Kamenica, Emir

AU - Munk, Inger

N1 - Jel Classification: D72;D73

PY - 2015/10

Y1 - 2015/10

N2 - Using data on Members of the European Parliament (MEPs), we examine the impact of salaries on the composition and the behavior of legislators. Employing a differences-in-differences approach, we exploit the introduction of a law that equalized MEPs’ salaries which had previously differed by as much as a factor of ten. Increasing salaries raises the fraction of MEPs who run for reelection but decreases the quality of elected MEPs (proxied by college quality). Salary has no discernible impact on effort or legislative output. Higher salaries induce more political competition.

AB - Using data on Members of the European Parliament (MEPs), we examine the impact of salaries on the composition and the behavior of legislators. Employing a differences-in-differences approach, we exploit the introduction of a law that equalized MEPs’ salaries which had previously differed by as much as a factor of ten. Increasing salaries raises the fraction of MEPs who run for reelection but decreases the quality of elected MEPs (proxied by college quality). Salary has no discernible impact on effort or legislative output. Higher salaries induce more political competition.

U2 - 10.1111/jeea.12141

DO - 10.1111/jeea.12141

M3 - Journal article

VL - 13

SP - 871

EP - 905

JO - Journal of the European Economic Association

JF - Journal of the European Economic Association

SN - 1542-4774

IS - 5

ER -

ID: 129709095