Labor Supply of Politicians

Publikation: Bidrag til tidsskriftTidsskriftartikelfagfællebedømt

Using data on Members of the European Parliament (MEPs), we examine the impact of salaries on the composition and the behavior of legislators. Employing a differences-in-differences approach, we exploit the introduction of a law that equalized MEPs’ salaries which had previously differed by as much as a factor of ten. Increasing salaries raises the fraction of MEPs who run for reelection but decreases the quality of elected MEPs (proxied by college quality). Salary has no discernible impact on effort or legislative output. Higher salaries induce more political competition.
OriginalsprogEngelsk
TidsskriftJournal of the European Economic Association
Vol/bind13
Udgave nummer5
Sider (fra-til)871-905
ISSN1542-4766
DOI
StatusUdgivet - okt. 2015

ID: 129709095