Strategic and welfare implications of bundling

Publikation: Bidrag til tidsskrift › Tidsskriftartikel › Forskning › fagfællebedømt

Standard

Strategic and welfare implications of bundling. / Martin, Stephen.

I: Economics Letters, Bind 62, Nr. 3, 1999, s. 371-376.

Publikation: Bidrag til tidsskrift › Tidsskriftartikel › Forskning › fagfællebedømt

Harvard

Martin, S 1999, 'Strategic and welfare implications of bundling', Economics Letters, bind 62, nr. 3, s. 371-376. https://doi.org/10.1016/S0165-1765(98)00236-5

APA

Martin, S. (1999). Strategic and welfare implications of bundling. Economics Letters, 62(3), 371-376. https://doi.org/10.1016/S0165-1765(98)00236-5

Vancouver

Martin S. Strategic and welfare implications of bundling. Economics Letters. 1999;62(3):371-376. https://doi.org/10.1016/S0165-1765(98)00236-5

Author

Martin, Stephen. / Strategic and welfare implications of bundling. I: Economics Letters. 1999 ; Bind 62, Nr. 3. s. 371-376.

Bibtex

@article{99c2aae074c611dbbee902004c4f4f50,
title = "Strategic and welfare implications of bundling",
abstract = "A standard oligopoly model of bundling shows that bundling by a firm with a monopoly over one product has a strategic effect because it changes the substitution relationships between the goods among which consumers choose. Bundling in appropriate proportions is privately profitable, reduces rivals' profits and overall welfare, and may drive rivals from the market",
author = "Stephen Martin",
note = "JEL Classification: L12, L41",
year = "1999",
doi = "10.1016/S0165-1765(98)00236-5",
language = "English",
volume = "62",
pages = "371--376",
journal = "Economics Letters",
issn = "0165-1765",
publisher = "Elsevier",
number = "3",

}

RIS

TY - JOUR

T1 - Strategic and welfare implications of bundling

AU - Martin, Stephen

N1 - JEL Classification: L12, L41

PY - 1999

Y1 - 1999

N2 - A standard oligopoly model of bundling shows that bundling by a firm with a monopoly over one product has a strategic effect because it changes the substitution relationships between the goods among which consumers choose. Bundling in appropriate proportions is privately profitable, reduces rivals' profits and overall welfare, and may drive rivals from the market

AB - A standard oligopoly model of bundling shows that bundling by a firm with a monopoly over one product has a strategic effect because it changes the substitution relationships between the goods among which consumers choose. Bundling in appropriate proportions is privately profitable, reduces rivals' profits and overall welfare, and may drive rivals from the market

U2 - 10.1016/S0165-1765(98)00236-5

DO - 10.1016/S0165-1765(98)00236-5

M3 - Journal article

VL - 62

SP - 371

EP - 376

JO - Economics Letters

JF - Economics Letters

SN - 0165-1765

IS - 3

ER -

ID: 153898