Strategic and welfare implications of bundling
Publikation: Bidrag til tidsskrift › Tidsskriftartikel › Forskning › fagfællebedømt
A standard oligopoly model of bundling shows that bundling by a firm with a monopoly over one product has a strategic effect because it changes the substitution relationships between the goods among which consumers choose. Bundling in appropriate proportions is privately profitable, reduces rivals' profits and overall welfare, and may drive rivals from the market
Originalsprog | Engelsk |
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Tidsskrift | Economics Letters |
Vol/bind | 62 |
Udgave nummer | 3 |
Sider (fra-til) | 371-376 |
ISSN | 0165-1765 |
DOI | |
Status | Udgivet - 1999 |
Bibliografisk note
JEL Classification: L12, L41
ID: 153898