Persuasion in Experimental Ultimatum Games

Publikation: Working paperForskning

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  • Ola Andersson
  • Matteo Galizzi
  • Tim Hoppe
  • Sebastian Kranz
  • Karen van der Wiel
  • Erik Roland Wengström
 This paper experimentally studies persuasion effects in ultimatum games and finds that Proposers' payoffs significantly increase if, along with offers, they can send messages which Responders read before their acceptance decision. Higher payoffs are due to higher acceptance rates as well as more aggressive offers by Proposers.
OriginalsprogEngelsk
Antal sider8
StatusUdgivet - 2008

Bibliografisk note

JEL classification: C72, C91, D83

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