Persuasion in Experimental Ultimatum Games

Publikation: Working paper › Forskning

Standard

Persuasion in Experimental Ultimatum Games. / Andersson, Ola; Galizzi, Matteo; Hoppe, Tim; Kranz, Sebastian; van der Wiel, Karen; Wengström, Erik Roland.

2008.

Publikation: Working paper › Forskning

Harvard

Andersson, O, Galizzi, M, Hoppe, T, Kranz, S, van der Wiel, K & Wengström, ER 2008 'Persuasion in Experimental Ultimatum Games'.

APA

Andersson, O., Galizzi, M., Hoppe, T., Kranz, S., van der Wiel, K., & Wengström, E. R. (2008). Persuasion in Experimental Ultimatum Games.

Vancouver

Andersson O, Galizzi M, Hoppe T, Kranz S, van der Wiel K, Wengström ER. Persuasion in Experimental Ultimatum Games. 2008.

Author

Andersson, Ola ; Galizzi, Matteo ; Hoppe, Tim ; Kranz, Sebastian ; van der Wiel, Karen ; Wengström, Erik Roland. / Persuasion in Experimental Ultimatum Games. 2008.

Bibtex

@techreport{d90cfff09b8f11debc73000ea68e967b,
title = "Persuasion in Experimental Ultimatum Games",
abstract = " This paper experimentally studies persuasion effects in ultimatum games and finds that Proposers' payoffs significantly increase if, along with offers, they can send messages which Responders read before their acceptance decision. Higher payoffs are due to higher acceptance rates as well as more aggressive offers by Proposers.",
author = "Ola Andersson and Matteo Galizzi and Tim Hoppe and Sebastian Kranz and {van der Wiel}, Karen and Wengstr{\"o}m, {Erik Roland}",
note = "JEL classification: C72, C91, D83",
year = "2008",
language = "English",
type = "WorkingPaper",

}

RIS

TY - UNPB

T1 - Persuasion in Experimental Ultimatum Games

AU - Andersson, Ola

AU - Galizzi, Matteo

AU - Hoppe, Tim

AU - Kranz, Sebastian

AU - van der Wiel, Karen

AU - Wengström, Erik Roland

N1 - JEL classification: C72, C91, D83

PY - 2008

Y1 - 2008

N2 -  This paper experimentally studies persuasion effects in ultimatum games and finds that Proposers' payoffs significantly increase if, along with offers, they can send messages which Responders read before their acceptance decision. Higher payoffs are due to higher acceptance rates as well as more aggressive offers by Proposers.

AB -  This paper experimentally studies persuasion effects in ultimatum games and finds that Proposers' payoffs significantly increase if, along with offers, they can send messages which Responders read before their acceptance decision. Higher payoffs are due to higher acceptance rates as well as more aggressive offers by Proposers.

M3 - Working paper

BT - Persuasion in Experimental Ultimatum Games

ER -

ID: 14248700