Adaptation and complexity in repeated games

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Standard

Adaptation and complexity in repeated games. / Maenner, Eliot Alexander.

I: Games and Economic Behavior, Bind 63, Nr. 1, 2008, s. 166-187.

Publikation: Bidrag til tidsskrift › Tidsskriftartikel › Forskning › fagfællebedømt

Harvard

Maenner, EA 2008, 'Adaptation and complexity in repeated games', Games and Economic Behavior, bind 63, nr. 1, s. 166-187. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2007.07.008

APA

Maenner, E. A. (2008). Adaptation and complexity in repeated games. Games and Economic Behavior, 63(1), 166-187. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2007.07.008

Vancouver

Maenner EA. Adaptation and complexity in repeated games. Games and Economic Behavior. 2008;63(1):166-187. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2007.07.008

Author

Maenner, Eliot Alexander. / Adaptation and complexity in repeated games. I: Games and Economic Behavior. 2008 ; Bind 63, Nr. 1. s. 166-187.

Bibtex

@article{eff415f0aa3211dcbee902004c4f4f50,
title = "Adaptation and complexity in repeated games",
abstract = "The paper presents a learning model for two-player infinitely repeated games. In an inference step players construct minimally complex inferences of strategies based on observed play, and in an adaptation step players choose minimally complex best responses to an inference. When players randomly select an inference from a probability distribution with full support the set of steady states is a subset of the set of Nash equilibria in which only stage game Nash equilibria are played. When players make {\textquoteleft}cautious' inferences the set of steady states is the subset of self-confirming equilibria with Nash outcome paths. When players use different inference rules, the set of steady states can lie between the previous two cases",
keywords = "Faculty of Social Sciences, learning, bounded rationality",
author = "Maenner, {Eliot Alexander}",
note = "JEL classification: C72, D83",
year = "2008",
doi = "10.1016/j.geb.2007.07.008",
language = "English",
volume = "63",
pages = "166--187",
journal = "Games and Economic Behavior",
issn = "0899-8256",
publisher = "Academic Press",
number = "1",

}

RIS

TY - JOUR

T1 - Adaptation and complexity in repeated games

AU - Maenner, Eliot Alexander

N1 - JEL classification: C72, D83

PY - 2008

Y1 - 2008

N2 - The paper presents a learning model for two-player infinitely repeated games. In an inference step players construct minimally complex inferences of strategies based on observed play, and in an adaptation step players choose minimally complex best responses to an inference. When players randomly select an inference from a probability distribution with full support the set of steady states is a subset of the set of Nash equilibria in which only stage game Nash equilibria are played. When players make ‘cautious' inferences the set of steady states is the subset of self-confirming equilibria with Nash outcome paths. When players use different inference rules, the set of steady states can lie between the previous two cases

AB - The paper presents a learning model for two-player infinitely repeated games. In an inference step players construct minimally complex inferences of strategies based on observed play, and in an adaptation step players choose minimally complex best responses to an inference. When players randomly select an inference from a probability distribution with full support the set of steady states is a subset of the set of Nash equilibria in which only stage game Nash equilibria are played. When players make ‘cautious' inferences the set of steady states is the subset of self-confirming equilibria with Nash outcome paths. When players use different inference rules, the set of steady states can lie between the previous two cases

KW - Faculty of Social Sciences

KW - learning

KW - bounded rationality

U2 - 10.1016/j.geb.2007.07.008

DO - 10.1016/j.geb.2007.07.008

M3 - Journal article

VL - 63

SP - 166

EP - 187

JO - Games and Economic Behavior

JF - Games and Economic Behavior

SN - 0899-8256

IS - 1

ER -

ID: 1847349