Adaptation and complexity in repeated games

Publikation: Bidrag til tidsskriftTidsskriftartikelfagfællebedømt

  • Eliot Alexander Maenner
The paper presents a learning model for two-player infinitely repeated games. In an inference step players construct minimally complex inferences of strategies based on observed play, and in an adaptation step players choose minimally complex best responses to an inference. When players randomly select an inference from a probability distribution with full support the set of steady states is a subset of the set of Nash equilibria in which only stage game Nash equilibria are played. When players make ‘cautious' inferences the set of steady states is the subset of self-confirming equilibria with Nash outcome paths. When players use different inference rules, the set of steady states can lie between the previous two cases
OriginalsprogEngelsk
TidsskriftGames and Economic Behavior
Vol/bind63
Udgave nummer1
Sider (fra-til)166-187
Antal sider22
ISSN0899-8256
DOI
StatusUdgivet - 2008

Bibliografisk note

JEL classification: C72, D83

ID: 1847349