Terrorism, Anti-Terrorism, and the Copycat Effect

Publikation: Working paperForskning

Standard

Terrorism, Anti-Terrorism, and the Copycat Effect. / Jensen, Thomas.

Department of Economics, University of Copenhagen, 2007.

Publikation: Working paperForskning

Harvard

Jensen, T 2007 'Terrorism, Anti-Terrorism, and the Copycat Effect' Department of Economics, University of Copenhagen.

APA

Jensen, T. (2007). Terrorism, Anti-Terrorism, and the Copycat Effect. Department of Economics, University of Copenhagen.

Vancouver

Jensen T. Terrorism, Anti-Terrorism, and the Copycat Effect. Department of Economics, University of Copenhagen. 2007.

Author

Jensen, Thomas. / Terrorism, Anti-Terrorism, and the Copycat Effect. Department of Economics, University of Copenhagen, 2007.

Bibtex

@techreport{6144c3c0499a11dcbee902004c4f4f50,
title = "Terrorism, Anti-Terrorism, and the Copycat Effect",
abstract = "In this paper we formulate and analyze a simple dynamic model of the interaction between terrorists and authorities. Our primary aim is to analyze how the introduction of a so called copycat effect influences behavior and outcomes. We first show that our simple model of terrorist cells implies that an increase in anti-terrorism makes it more likely that cells will plan small rather than large attacks. Furthermore, we see that an increase in anti-terrorism can make a terrorist attack more likely. Analyzing the problem of optimal anti-terrorism we see that the introduction of a copycat effect rationalizes an increase in the level of anti-terrorism after a large attack. Using this result we show how the copycat effect changes the dynamic pattern of terrorism attacks and what the long run consequences are",
keywords = "Faculty of Social Sciences, terrorist cells, optimal anti-terrorism, copycat effect",
author = "Thomas Jensen",
note = "JEL Classification: D74, H56",
year = "2007",
language = "English",
publisher = "Department of Economics, University of Copenhagen",
address = "Denmark",
type = "WorkingPaper",
institution = "Department of Economics, University of Copenhagen",

}

RIS

TY - UNPB

T1 - Terrorism, Anti-Terrorism, and the Copycat Effect

AU - Jensen, Thomas

N1 - JEL Classification: D74, H56

PY - 2007

Y1 - 2007

N2 - In this paper we formulate and analyze a simple dynamic model of the interaction between terrorists and authorities. Our primary aim is to analyze how the introduction of a so called copycat effect influences behavior and outcomes. We first show that our simple model of terrorist cells implies that an increase in anti-terrorism makes it more likely that cells will plan small rather than large attacks. Furthermore, we see that an increase in anti-terrorism can make a terrorist attack more likely. Analyzing the problem of optimal anti-terrorism we see that the introduction of a copycat effect rationalizes an increase in the level of anti-terrorism after a large attack. Using this result we show how the copycat effect changes the dynamic pattern of terrorism attacks and what the long run consequences are

AB - In this paper we formulate and analyze a simple dynamic model of the interaction between terrorists and authorities. Our primary aim is to analyze how the introduction of a so called copycat effect influences behavior and outcomes. We first show that our simple model of terrorist cells implies that an increase in anti-terrorism makes it more likely that cells will plan small rather than large attacks. Furthermore, we see that an increase in anti-terrorism can make a terrorist attack more likely. Analyzing the problem of optimal anti-terrorism we see that the introduction of a copycat effect rationalizes an increase in the level of anti-terrorism after a large attack. Using this result we show how the copycat effect changes the dynamic pattern of terrorism attacks and what the long run consequences are

KW - Faculty of Social Sciences

KW - terrorist cells

KW - optimal anti-terrorism

KW - copycat effect

M3 - Working paper

BT - Terrorism, Anti-Terrorism, and the Copycat Effect

PB - Department of Economics, University of Copenhagen

ER -

ID: 877346