Social security as Markov equilibrium in OLG models: A note

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Social security as Markov equilibrium in OLG models: A note. / Gonzalez Eiras, Martin.

I: Review of Economic Dynamics, Bind 14, Nr. 3, 2011, s. 549-552.

Publikation: Bidrag til tidsskrift › Tidsskriftartikel › Forskning › fagfællebedømt

Harvard

Gonzalez Eiras, M 2011, 'Social security as Markov equilibrium in OLG models: A note', Review of Economic Dynamics, bind 14, nr. 3, s. 549-552.

APA

Gonzalez Eiras, M. (2011). Social security as Markov equilibrium in OLG models: A note. Review of Economic Dynamics, 14(3), 549-552.

Vancouver

Gonzalez Eiras M. Social security as Markov equilibrium in OLG models: A note. Review of Economic Dynamics. 2011;14(3):549-552.

Author

Gonzalez Eiras, Martin. / Social security as Markov equilibrium in OLG models: A note. I: Review of Economic Dynamics. 2011 ; Bind 14, Nr. 3. s. 549-552.

Bibtex

@article{ba293509b04647c980200d29c1f5aa8c,
title = "Social security as Markov equilibrium in OLG models: A note",
abstract = "I refine and extend the Markov perfect equilibrium of the social security policy game in Forni (2005) for the special case of logarithmic utility. Under the restriction that the policy function be continuous, instead of differentiable, the equilibrium is globally well defined and its dynamics always stable.",
keywords = "Faculty of Social Sciences, social security, overlapping generation models, Markov equilibria",
author = "{Gonzalez Eiras}, Martin",
note = "JEL classification: C72; H55",
year = "2011",
language = "English",
volume = "14",
pages = "549--552",
journal = "Review of Economic Dynamics",
issn = "1094-2025",
publisher = "Academic Press",
number = "3",

}

RIS

TY - JOUR

T1 - Social security as Markov equilibrium in OLG models: A note

AU - Gonzalez Eiras, Martin

N1 - JEL classification: C72; H55

PY - 2011

Y1 - 2011

N2 - I refine and extend the Markov perfect equilibrium of the social security policy game in Forni (2005) for the special case of logarithmic utility. Under the restriction that the policy function be continuous, instead of differentiable, the equilibrium is globally well defined and its dynamics always stable.

AB - I refine and extend the Markov perfect equilibrium of the social security policy game in Forni (2005) for the special case of logarithmic utility. Under the restriction that the policy function be continuous, instead of differentiable, the equilibrium is globally well defined and its dynamics always stable.

KW - Faculty of Social Sciences

KW - social security

KW - overlapping generation models

KW - Markov equilibria

M3 - Journal article

VL - 14

SP - 549

EP - 552

JO - Review of Economic Dynamics

JF - Review of Economic Dynamics

SN - 1094-2025

IS - 3

ER -

ID: 46842414