Optimal tax progressivity in imperfect labour markets

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Standard

Optimal tax progressivity in imperfect labour markets. / Sørensen, Peter Birch.

I: Labour Economics, Bind 6, Nr. 3, 1999, s. 435-452.

Publikation: Bidrag til tidsskrift › Tidsskriftartikel › Forskning › fagfællebedømt

Harvard

Sørensen, PB 1999, 'Optimal tax progressivity in imperfect labour markets', Labour Economics, bind 6, nr. 3, s. 435-452. https://doi.org/10.1016/S0927-5371(99)00021-4

APA

Sørensen, P. B. (1999). Optimal tax progressivity in imperfect labour markets. Labour Economics, 6(3), 435-452. https://doi.org/10.1016/S0927-5371(99)00021-4

Vancouver

Sørensen PB. Optimal tax progressivity in imperfect labour markets. Labour Economics. 1999;6(3):435-452. https://doi.org/10.1016/S0927-5371(99)00021-4

Author

Sørensen, Peter Birch. / Optimal tax progressivity in imperfect labour markets. I: Labour Economics. 1999 ; Bind 6, Nr. 3. s. 435-452.

Bibtex

@article{7c5df2c074c611dbbee902004c4f4f50,
title = "Optimal tax progressivity in imperfect labour markets",
abstract = "All modern labour market theories capable of explaining involuntary unemployment as an equilibrium phenomenon imply that increased income tax progressivity reduces unemployment, but they also imply that higher progressivity tends to reduce work effort and labour productivity. This suggests that there may be an optimal degree of tax progressivity where the marginal welfare gain from reduced involuntary unemployment is just offset by the marginal welfare loss from lower productivity. This paper sets up four different models of an imperfect labour market in order to identify the degree of tax progressivity which would maximise the welfare of the representative wage earner. Simulations with these models suggest that the optimal degree of tax progressivity could be quite large, although the results are sensitive to the generosity of unemployment benefits and to the after-tax wage elasticity of work effort",
author = "S{\o}rensen, {Peter Birch}",
note = "JEL Classification: J30, J50, J60, H21",
year = "1999",
doi = "10.1016/S0927-5371(99)00021-4",
language = "English",
volume = "6",
pages = "435--452",
journal = "Labour Economics",
issn = "0927-5371",
publisher = "Elsevier BV * North-Holland",
number = "3",

}

RIS

TY - JOUR

T1 - Optimal tax progressivity in imperfect labour markets

AU - Sørensen, Peter Birch

N1 - JEL Classification: J30, J50, J60, H21

PY - 1999

Y1 - 1999

N2 - All modern labour market theories capable of explaining involuntary unemployment as an equilibrium phenomenon imply that increased income tax progressivity reduces unemployment, but they also imply that higher progressivity tends to reduce work effort and labour productivity. This suggests that there may be an optimal degree of tax progressivity where the marginal welfare gain from reduced involuntary unemployment is just offset by the marginal welfare loss from lower productivity. This paper sets up four different models of an imperfect labour market in order to identify the degree of tax progressivity which would maximise the welfare of the representative wage earner. Simulations with these models suggest that the optimal degree of tax progressivity could be quite large, although the results are sensitive to the generosity of unemployment benefits and to the after-tax wage elasticity of work effort

AB - All modern labour market theories capable of explaining involuntary unemployment as an equilibrium phenomenon imply that increased income tax progressivity reduces unemployment, but they also imply that higher progressivity tends to reduce work effort and labour productivity. This suggests that there may be an optimal degree of tax progressivity where the marginal welfare gain from reduced involuntary unemployment is just offset by the marginal welfare loss from lower productivity. This paper sets up four different models of an imperfect labour market in order to identify the degree of tax progressivity which would maximise the welfare of the representative wage earner. Simulations with these models suggest that the optimal degree of tax progressivity could be quite large, although the results are sensitive to the generosity of unemployment benefits and to the after-tax wage elasticity of work effort

U2 - 10.1016/S0927-5371(99)00021-4

DO - 10.1016/S0927-5371(99)00021-4

M3 - Journal article

VL - 6

SP - 435

EP - 452

JO - Labour Economics

JF - Labour Economics

SN - 0927-5371

IS - 3

ER -

ID: 151895