Inflation Dynamics and Real Marginal Costs: New Evidence from U.S. Manufacturing Industries

Publikation: Working paperForskning

Standard

Inflation Dynamics and Real Marginal Costs : New Evidence from U.S. Manufacturing Industries. / Petrella, Ivan ; Santoro, Emiliano.

Department of Economics, University of Copenhagen, 2011.

Publikation: Working paperForskning

Harvard

Petrella, I & Santoro, E 2011 'Inflation Dynamics and Real Marginal Costs: New Evidence from U.S. Manufacturing Industries' Department of Economics, University of Copenhagen. <https://www.econ.ku.dk/english/research/publications/wp/dp_2011/1132.pdf/>

APA

Petrella, I., & Santoro, E. (2011). Inflation Dynamics and Real Marginal Costs: New Evidence from U.S. Manufacturing Industries. Department of Economics, University of Copenhagen. https://www.econ.ku.dk/english/research/publications/wp/dp_2011/1132.pdf/

Vancouver

Petrella I, Santoro E. Inflation Dynamics and Real Marginal Costs: New Evidence from U.S. Manufacturing Industries. Department of Economics, University of Copenhagen. 2011.

Author

Petrella, Ivan ; Santoro, Emiliano. / Inflation Dynamics and Real Marginal Costs : New Evidence from U.S. Manufacturing Industries. Department of Economics, University of Copenhagen, 2011.

Bibtex

@techreport{fe7ce9caa92f404ba5cdbf8872ce5c7a,
title = "Inflation Dynamics and Real Marginal Costs: New Evidence from U.S. Manufacturing Industries",
abstract = "Introducing a threshold in the sense of a minimal project size transforms a public goods game with an inefficient equilibrium into a coordination game with a set of Pareto-superior equilibria. Thresholds may therefore improve efficiency in the voluntary provision of public goods. In our one-shot experiment, we find that coordination often fails and exogenously imposed thresholds are ineffective at best and often counter-productive. This holds under a range of threshold levels and refund rates. We test if thresholds perform better if they are endogenously chosen, i.e. if a threshold is approved in a referendum, because voting may facilitate coordination due to signaling and commitment effects. We find that voting does have signaling and commitment effects but they are not strong enough to significantly improve the efficiency of thresholds.",
keywords = "Faculty of Social Sciences, provision of public goods, threshold, experiment",
author = "Ivan Petrella and Emiliano Santoro",
note = "JEL Classification: E31, L60",
year = "2011",
language = "English",
publisher = "Department of Economics, University of Copenhagen",
address = "Denmark",
type = "WorkingPaper",
institution = "Department of Economics, University of Copenhagen",

}

RIS

TY - UNPB

T1 - Inflation Dynamics and Real Marginal Costs

T2 - New Evidence from U.S. Manufacturing Industries

AU - Petrella, Ivan

AU - Santoro, Emiliano

N1 - JEL Classification: E31, L60

PY - 2011

Y1 - 2011

N2 - Introducing a threshold in the sense of a minimal project size transforms a public goods game with an inefficient equilibrium into a coordination game with a set of Pareto-superior equilibria. Thresholds may therefore improve efficiency in the voluntary provision of public goods. In our one-shot experiment, we find that coordination often fails and exogenously imposed thresholds are ineffective at best and often counter-productive. This holds under a range of threshold levels and refund rates. We test if thresholds perform better if they are endogenously chosen, i.e. if a threshold is approved in a referendum, because voting may facilitate coordination due to signaling and commitment effects. We find that voting does have signaling and commitment effects but they are not strong enough to significantly improve the efficiency of thresholds.

AB - Introducing a threshold in the sense of a minimal project size transforms a public goods game with an inefficient equilibrium into a coordination game with a set of Pareto-superior equilibria. Thresholds may therefore improve efficiency in the voluntary provision of public goods. In our one-shot experiment, we find that coordination often fails and exogenously imposed thresholds are ineffective at best and often counter-productive. This holds under a range of threshold levels and refund rates. We test if thresholds perform better if they are endogenously chosen, i.e. if a threshold is approved in a referendum, because voting may facilitate coordination due to signaling and commitment effects. We find that voting does have signaling and commitment effects but they are not strong enough to significantly improve the efficiency of thresholds.

KW - Faculty of Social Sciences

KW - provision of public goods

KW - threshold

KW - experiment

M3 - Working paper

BT - Inflation Dynamics and Real Marginal Costs

PB - Department of Economics, University of Copenhagen

ER -

ID: 37424409