Disincentives from Redistribution: Evidence on a Dividend of Democracy
Publikation: Working paper › Forskning
We experimentally study the disincentive effect of taxing work and redistributing tax revenues when redistribution is imposed vs. democratically chosen in a vote. We find a “dividend of democracy” in the sense that the disincentive effect is substantially smaller when redistribution is chosen in a vote than when it is imposed. Redistribution seems to be more legitimate, and hence less demotivating, when accepted in a vote.
Originalsprog | Engelsk |
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Antal sider | 52 |
DOI | |
Status | Udgivet - 28 okt. 2019 |
Navn | University of Copenhagen. Institute of Economics. Discussion Papers (Online) |
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Nummer | 19-08 |
ISSN | 1601-2461 |
Links
- https://www.economics.ku.dk/research/publications/wp/dp_2019/1908.pdf
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