Competition, Cooperation, and Collective Choice

Publikation: Working paper › Forskning

Standard

Competition, Cooperation, and Collective Choice. / Markussen, Thomas; Reuben, Ernesto; Tyran, Jean-Robert.

2012.

Publikation: Working paper › Forskning

Harvard

Markussen, T, Reuben, E & Tyran, J-R 2012 'Competition, Cooperation, and Collective Choice'. https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2121436

APA

Markussen, T., Reuben, E., & Tyran, J-R. (2012). Competition, Cooperation, and Collective Choice. Univ. of Copenhagen Dept. of Economics Discussion Paper Nr. 12-04 https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2121436

Vancouver

Markussen T, Reuben E, Tyran J-R. Competition, Cooperation, and Collective Choice. 2012 aug. 2. https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2121436

Author

Markussen, Thomas ; Reuben, Ernesto ; Tyran, Jean-Robert. / Competition, Cooperation, and Collective Choice. 2012. (Univ. of Copenhagen Dept. of Economics Discussion Paper; Nr. 12-04).

Bibtex

@techreport{453cd4d7af9f414283c9a39aa97a4fda,
title = "Competition, Cooperation, and Collective Choice",
abstract = "The ability of groups to implement efficiency-enhancing institutions is emerging as a central theme of research in economics. This paper explores voting on a scheme of intergroup competition which facilitates cooperation in a social dilemma situation. Experimental results show that the competitive scheme fosters cooperation. Competition is popular but the electoral outcome depends strongly on specific voting rules of institutional choice. If the majority decides, competition is almost always adopted. If likely losers from competition have veto power, it is often not, and substantial gains in efficiency are foregone.",
keywords = "public goods, competition, tournament, cooperation, voting",
author = "Thomas Markussen and Ernesto Reuben and Jean-Robert Tyran",
year = "2012",
month = aug,
day = "2",
doi = "10.2139/ssrn.2121436",
language = "English",
series = "Univ. of Copenhagen Dept. of Economics Discussion Paper",
number = "12-04",
type = "WorkingPaper",

}

RIS

TY - UNPB

T1 - Competition, Cooperation, and Collective Choice

AU - Markussen, Thomas

AU - Reuben, Ernesto

AU - Tyran, Jean-Robert

PY - 2012/8/2

Y1 - 2012/8/2

N2 - The ability of groups to implement efficiency-enhancing institutions is emerging as a central theme of research in economics. This paper explores voting on a scheme of intergroup competition which facilitates cooperation in a social dilemma situation. Experimental results show that the competitive scheme fosters cooperation. Competition is popular but the electoral outcome depends strongly on specific voting rules of institutional choice. If the majority decides, competition is almost always adopted. If likely losers from competition have veto power, it is often not, and substantial gains in efficiency are foregone.

AB - The ability of groups to implement efficiency-enhancing institutions is emerging as a central theme of research in economics. This paper explores voting on a scheme of intergroup competition which facilitates cooperation in a social dilemma situation. Experimental results show that the competitive scheme fosters cooperation. Competition is popular but the electoral outcome depends strongly on specific voting rules of institutional choice. If the majority decides, competition is almost always adopted. If likely losers from competition have veto power, it is often not, and substantial gains in efficiency are foregone.

KW - public goods

KW - competition

KW - tournament

KW - cooperation

KW - voting

U2 - 10.2139/ssrn.2121436

DO - 10.2139/ssrn.2121436

M3 - Working paper

T3 - Univ. of Copenhagen Dept. of Economics Discussion Paper

BT - Competition, Cooperation, and Collective Choice

ER -

ID: 241647627