Arm's length delegation of public services

Publikation: Bidrag til tidsskrift › Tidsskriftartikel › Forskning › fagfællebedømt

Standard

Arm's length delegation of public services. / Bennedsen, Morten; Schultz, Christian.

I: Journal of Public Economics, Bind 95, Nr. 7-8, 2011, s. 543-552.

Publikation: Bidrag til tidsskrift › Tidsskriftartikel › Forskning › fagfællebedømt

Harvard

Bennedsen, M & Schultz, C 2011, 'Arm's length delegation of public services', Journal of Public Economics, bind 95, nr. 7-8, s. 543-552. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jpubeco.2011.02.002

APA

Bennedsen, M., & Schultz, C. (2011). Arm's length delegation of public services. Journal of Public Economics, 95(7-8), 543-552. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jpubeco.2011.02.002

Vancouver

Bennedsen M, Schultz C. Arm's length delegation of public services. Journal of Public Economics. 2011;95(7-8):543-552. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jpubeco.2011.02.002

Author

Bennedsen, Morten ; Schultz, Christian. / Arm's length delegation of public services. I: Journal of Public Economics. 2011 ; Bind 95, Nr. 7-8. s. 543-552.

Bibtex

@article{912617d3a82a46be99d2a02d7f71d248,
title = "Arm's length delegation of public services",
abstract = "Delegation is a key feature of political decision making: Mayors or prime ministers delegate to subordinates, voters delegate to elected representatives. We analyze the effect of political delegation on public service provision and the choice between private or public providers when contracts are incomplete and incentives therefore distorted. We identify two important effects: The incentive effect increases the incentive part of service providers' remuneration and delegation may therefore be a substitute for an explicit complete incentive contract. The bargaining effect improves the bargaining position vis a vis a private firm with market power. In general, these effects imply that delegation improves public service provision.",
keywords = "Representative democracy",
author = "Morten Bennedsen and Christian Schultz",
note = "JEL classification: D72, L33, L97 ",
year = "2011",
doi = "10.1016/j.jpubeco.2011.02.002",
language = "English",
volume = "95",
pages = "543--552",
journal = "Journal of Public Economics",
issn = "0047-2727",
publisher = "Elsevier",
number = "7-8",

}

RIS

TY - JOUR

T1 - Arm's length delegation of public services

AU - Bennedsen, Morten

AU - Schultz, Christian

N1 - JEL classification: D72, L33, L97

PY - 2011

Y1 - 2011

N2 - Delegation is a key feature of political decision making: Mayors or prime ministers delegate to subordinates, voters delegate to elected representatives. We analyze the effect of political delegation on public service provision and the choice between private or public providers when contracts are incomplete and incentives therefore distorted. We identify two important effects: The incentive effect increases the incentive part of service providers' remuneration and delegation may therefore be a substitute for an explicit complete incentive contract. The bargaining effect improves the bargaining position vis a vis a private firm with market power. In general, these effects imply that delegation improves public service provision.

AB - Delegation is a key feature of political decision making: Mayors or prime ministers delegate to subordinates, voters delegate to elected representatives. We analyze the effect of political delegation on public service provision and the choice between private or public providers when contracts are incomplete and incentives therefore distorted. We identify two important effects: The incentive effect increases the incentive part of service providers' remuneration and delegation may therefore be a substitute for an explicit complete incentive contract. The bargaining effect improves the bargaining position vis a vis a private firm with market power. In general, these effects imply that delegation improves public service provision.

KW - Representative democracy

U2 - 10.1016/j.jpubeco.2011.02.002

DO - 10.1016/j.jpubeco.2011.02.002

M3 - Journal article

VL - 95

SP - 543

EP - 552

JO - Journal of Public Economics

JF - Journal of Public Economics

SN - 0047-2727

IS - 7-8

ER -

ID: 33646043