Adaptive Learning in Extensive Form Games and Sequential Equilibrium

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Standard

Adaptive Learning in Extensive Form Games and Sequential Equilibrium. / Groes, Ebbe; Jacobsen, Hans Jørgen; Sloth, Birgitte.

I: Economic Theory, Bind 13, Nr. 1, 1999, s. 125-142.

Publikation: Bidrag til tidsskrift › Tidsskriftartikel › Forskning › fagfællebedømt

Harvard

Groes, E, Jacobsen, HJ & Sloth, B 1999, 'Adaptive Learning in Extensive Form Games and Sequential Equilibrium', Economic Theory, bind 13, nr. 1, s. 125-142. https://doi.org/10.1007/s001990050244

APA

Groes, E., Jacobsen, H. J., & Sloth, B. (1999). Adaptive Learning in Extensive Form Games and Sequential Equilibrium. Economic Theory, 13(1), 125-142. https://doi.org/10.1007/s001990050244

Vancouver

Groes E, Jacobsen HJ, Sloth B. Adaptive Learning in Extensive Form Games and Sequential Equilibrium. Economic Theory. 1999;13(1):125-142. https://doi.org/10.1007/s001990050244

Author

Groes, Ebbe ; Jacobsen, Hans Jørgen ; Sloth, Birgitte. / Adaptive Learning in Extensive Form Games and Sequential Equilibrium. I: Economic Theory. 1999 ; Bind 13, Nr. 1. s. 125-142.

Bibtex

@article{961e0ce074c611dbbee902004c4f4f50,
title = "Adaptive Learning in Extensive Form Games and Sequential Equilibrium",
abstract = "This paper studies adaptive learning in extensive form games and provides conditions for convergence points of adaptive learning to be sequential equilibria. Precisely, we present a set of conditions on learning sequences such that an assessment is a sequential equilibrium if and only if there is a learning sequence fulfilling the conditions, which leads to the assessment",
author = "Ebbe Groes and Jacobsen, {Hans J{\o}rgen} and Birgitte Sloth",
note = "JEL Classification: C72, D83",
year = "1999",
doi = "10.1007/s001990050244",
language = "English",
volume = "13",
pages = "125--142",
journal = "Economic Theory",
issn = "0938-2259",
publisher = "Springer",
number = "1",

}

RIS

TY - JOUR

T1 - Adaptive Learning in Extensive Form Games and Sequential Equilibrium

AU - Groes, Ebbe

AU - Jacobsen, Hans Jørgen

AU - Sloth, Birgitte

N1 - JEL Classification: C72, D83

PY - 1999

Y1 - 1999

N2 - This paper studies adaptive learning in extensive form games and provides conditions for convergence points of adaptive learning to be sequential equilibria. Precisely, we present a set of conditions on learning sequences such that an assessment is a sequential equilibrium if and only if there is a learning sequence fulfilling the conditions, which leads to the assessment

AB - This paper studies adaptive learning in extensive form games and provides conditions for convergence points of adaptive learning to be sequential equilibria. Precisely, we present a set of conditions on learning sequences such that an assessment is a sequential equilibrium if and only if there is a learning sequence fulfilling the conditions, which leads to the assessment

U2 - 10.1007/s001990050244

DO - 10.1007/s001990050244

M3 - Journal article

VL - 13

SP - 125

EP - 142

JO - Economic Theory

JF - Economic Theory

SN - 0938-2259

IS - 1

ER -

ID: 153593