Under pressure? Performance evaluation of police officers as an incentive to cheat

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Under pressure? Performance evaluation of police officers as an incentive to cheat. / Travova, Ekaterina.

I: Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization, Bind 212, 08.2023, s. 1143-1172.

Publikation: Bidrag til tidsskrift › Tidsskriftartikel › Forskning › fagfællebedømt

Harvard

Travova, E 2023, 'Under pressure? Performance evaluation of police officers as an incentive to cheat', Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization, bind 212, s. 1143-1172. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jebo.2023.05.021

APA

Travova, E. (2023). Under pressure? Performance evaluation of police officers as an incentive to cheat. Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization, 212, 1143-1172. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jebo.2023.05.021

Vancouver

Travova E. Under pressure? Performance evaluation of police officers as an incentive to cheat. Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization. 2023 aug.;212:1143-1172. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jebo.2023.05.021

Author

Travova, Ekaterina. / Under pressure? Performance evaluation of police officers as an incentive to cheat. I: Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization. 2023 ; Bind 212. s. 1143-1172.

Bibtex

@article{a80aebaa2fb649898269169cbba426c6,
title = "Under pressure? Performance evaluation of police officers as an incentive to cheat",
abstract = "This paper examines the use of high-powered performance-based incentives for civil servants, focusing on drug-related cases registered by the Russian police. Using an event study approach and bunching analysis, I show that the incentives arising from the performance evaluation system of police officers can significantly influence their behavior. Specifically, I find evidence suggesting that this impact can result in the manipulation of drug quantities seized by the police, moving offenders from below to above the punishment threshold. Further negative consequences of the strong performance-based incentives are inequality in the enforcement of law, prolonged sentences, and increased probability of pretrial detention. Thus, I determine that police officers are more likely to manipulate the drug quantities seized from men. I also find that the manipulation increases the probability of pretrial detention by 9% and adds one more year of incarceration, which is a 67% increase on the average sentence length without manipulation.",
keywords = "Drug crimes, Incentives, Performance evaluation, Police discretion",
author = "Ekaterina Travova",
note = "Publisher Copyright: {\textcopyright} 2023",
year = "2023",
month = aug,
doi = "10.1016/j.jebo.2023.05.021",
language = "English",
volume = "212",
pages = "1143--1172",
journal = "Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization",
issn = "0167-2681",
publisher = "Elsevier",

}

RIS

TY - JOUR

T1 - Under pressure? Performance evaluation of police officers as an incentive to cheat

AU - Travova, Ekaterina

N1 - Publisher Copyright: © 2023

PY - 2023/8

Y1 - 2023/8

N2 - This paper examines the use of high-powered performance-based incentives for civil servants, focusing on drug-related cases registered by the Russian police. Using an event study approach and bunching analysis, I show that the incentives arising from the performance evaluation system of police officers can significantly influence their behavior. Specifically, I find evidence suggesting that this impact can result in the manipulation of drug quantities seized by the police, moving offenders from below to above the punishment threshold. Further negative consequences of the strong performance-based incentives are inequality in the enforcement of law, prolonged sentences, and increased probability of pretrial detention. Thus, I determine that police officers are more likely to manipulate the drug quantities seized from men. I also find that the manipulation increases the probability of pretrial detention by 9% and adds one more year of incarceration, which is a 67% increase on the average sentence length without manipulation.

AB - This paper examines the use of high-powered performance-based incentives for civil servants, focusing on drug-related cases registered by the Russian police. Using an event study approach and bunching analysis, I show that the incentives arising from the performance evaluation system of police officers can significantly influence their behavior. Specifically, I find evidence suggesting that this impact can result in the manipulation of drug quantities seized by the police, moving offenders from below to above the punishment threshold. Further negative consequences of the strong performance-based incentives are inequality in the enforcement of law, prolonged sentences, and increased probability of pretrial detention. Thus, I determine that police officers are more likely to manipulate the drug quantities seized from men. I also find that the manipulation increases the probability of pretrial detention by 9% and adds one more year of incarceration, which is a 67% increase on the average sentence length without manipulation.

KW - Drug crimes

KW - Incentives

KW - Performance evaluation

KW - Police discretion

U2 - 10.1016/j.jebo.2023.05.021

DO - 10.1016/j.jebo.2023.05.021

M3 - Journal article

AN - SCOPUS:85165238852

VL - 212

SP - 1143

EP - 1172

JO - Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization

JF - Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization

SN - 0167-2681

ER -

ID: 371568945