Two-stage bargaining with coverage extension in a dual labour market

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Standard

Two-stage bargaining with coverage extension in a dual labour market. / Roberts, Mark A.; Stæhr, Karsten; Tranæs, Torben.

I: European Economic Review, Bind 44, Nr. 1, 2000, s. 181-200.

Publikation: Bidrag til tidsskrift › Tidsskriftartikel › Forskning › fagfællebedømt

Harvard

Roberts, MA, Stæhr, K & Tranæs, T 2000, 'Two-stage bargaining with coverage extension in a dual labour market', European Economic Review, bind 44, nr. 1, s. 181-200. https://doi.org/10.1016/S0014-2921(98)00056-7

APA

Roberts, M. A., Stæhr, K., & Tranæs, T. (2000). Two-stage bargaining with coverage extension in a dual labour market. European Economic Review, 44(1), 181-200. https://doi.org/10.1016/S0014-2921(98)00056-7

Vancouver

Roberts MA, Stæhr K, Tranæs T. Two-stage bargaining with coverage extension in a dual labour market. European Economic Review. 2000;44(1):181-200. https://doi.org/10.1016/S0014-2921(98)00056-7

Author

Roberts, Mark A. ; Stæhr, Karsten ; Tranæs, Torben. / Two-stage bargaining with coverage extension in a dual labour market. I: European Economic Review. 2000 ; Bind 44, Nr. 1. s. 181-200.

Bibtex

@article{479fc04074c611dbbee902004c4f4f50,
title = "Two-stage bargaining with coverage extension in a dual labour market",
abstract = "This paper studies coverage extension in a simple general equilibrium model with a dual labour market. The union sector is characterized by two-stage bargaining whereas the firms set wages in the non-union sector. In this model firms and unions of the union sector have a commonality of interest in extending coverage of a minimum wage to the non-union sector. Furthermore, the union sector does not seek to increase the non-union wage to a level above the market-clearing wage. In fact, it is optimal for the union sector to impose a market-clearing wage on the non-union sector. Finally, coverage extension increases welfare in this model",
author = "Roberts, {Mark A.} and Karsten St{\ae}hr and Torben Tran{\ae}s",
note = "JEL Classification: J42, J31, J50",
year = "2000",
doi = "10.1016/S0014-2921(98)00056-7",
language = "English",
volume = "44",
pages = "181--200",
journal = "European Economic Review",
issn = "0014-2921",
publisher = "Elsevier",
number = "1",

}

RIS

TY - JOUR

T1 - Two-stage bargaining with coverage extension in a dual labour market

AU - Roberts, Mark A.

AU - Stæhr, Karsten

AU - Tranæs, Torben

N1 - JEL Classification: J42, J31, J50

PY - 2000

Y1 - 2000

N2 - This paper studies coverage extension in a simple general equilibrium model with a dual labour market. The union sector is characterized by two-stage bargaining whereas the firms set wages in the non-union sector. In this model firms and unions of the union sector have a commonality of interest in extending coverage of a minimum wage to the non-union sector. Furthermore, the union sector does not seek to increase the non-union wage to a level above the market-clearing wage. In fact, it is optimal for the union sector to impose a market-clearing wage on the non-union sector. Finally, coverage extension increases welfare in this model

AB - This paper studies coverage extension in a simple general equilibrium model with a dual labour market. The union sector is characterized by two-stage bargaining whereas the firms set wages in the non-union sector. In this model firms and unions of the union sector have a commonality of interest in extending coverage of a minimum wage to the non-union sector. Furthermore, the union sector does not seek to increase the non-union wage to a level above the market-clearing wage. In fact, it is optimal for the union sector to impose a market-clearing wage on the non-union sector. Finally, coverage extension increases welfare in this model

U2 - 10.1016/S0014-2921(98)00056-7

DO - 10.1016/S0014-2921(98)00056-7

M3 - Journal article

VL - 44

SP - 181

EP - 200

JO - European Economic Review

JF - European Economic Review

SN - 0014-2921

IS - 1

ER -

ID: 149231