Trip-timing decisions with traffic incidents

Publikation: Bidrag til tidsskriftTidsskriftartikelForskningfagfællebedømt

Standard

Trip-timing decisions with traffic incidents. / Fosgerau, Mogens; Lindsey, Robin.

I: Regional Science and Urban Economics, Bind 43, Nr. 5, 2013, s. 764-782.

Publikation: Bidrag til tidsskriftTidsskriftartikelForskningfagfællebedømt

Harvard

Fosgerau, M & Lindsey, R 2013, 'Trip-timing decisions with traffic incidents', Regional Science and Urban Economics, bind 43, nr. 5, s. 764-782. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.regsciurbeco.2013.07.002

APA

Fosgerau, M., & Lindsey, R. (2013). Trip-timing decisions with traffic incidents. Regional Science and Urban Economics, 43(5), 764-782. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.regsciurbeco.2013.07.002

Vancouver

Fosgerau M, Lindsey R. Trip-timing decisions with traffic incidents. Regional Science and Urban Economics. 2013;43(5):764-782. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.regsciurbeco.2013.07.002

Author

Fosgerau, Mogens ; Lindsey, Robin. / Trip-timing decisions with traffic incidents. I: Regional Science and Urban Economics. 2013 ; Bind 43, Nr. 5. s. 764-782.

Bibtex

@article{895fb167d4104aeba9688875149bbb64,
title = "Trip-timing decisions with traffic incidents",
abstract = "This paper analyzes traffic bottleneck congestion when drivers randomly cause incidents that temporarily block the bottleneck. Drivers have general scheduling preferences for time spent at home and at work. They independently choose morning departure times from home to maximize expected utility without knowing whether an incident has occurred. The resulting departure time pattern may be compressed or dispersed according to whether or not the bottleneck is fully utilized throughout the departure period on days without incidents. For both the user equilibrium (UE) and the social optimum (SO) the departure pattern changes from compressed to dispersed when the probability of an incident becomes sufficiently high. The SO can be decentralized with a time-varying toll, but drivers are likely to be strictly worse off than in the UE unless they benefit from the toll revenues in some way. A numerical example is presented for illustration. Finally, the model is extended to encompass minor incidents in which the bottleneck retains some capacity during an incident.",
keywords = "Bottleneck model, Congestion, Departure-time decisions, Evening commute, Morning commute, Scheduling utility, Traffic incidents",
author = "Mogens Fosgerau and Robin Lindsey",
year = "2013",
doi = "10.1016/j.regsciurbeco.2013.07.002",
language = "English",
volume = "43",
pages = "764--782",
journal = "Regional Science and Urban Economics",
issn = "0166-0462",
publisher = "Elsevier",
number = "5",

}

RIS

TY - JOUR

T1 - Trip-timing decisions with traffic incidents

AU - Fosgerau, Mogens

AU - Lindsey, Robin

PY - 2013

Y1 - 2013

N2 - This paper analyzes traffic bottleneck congestion when drivers randomly cause incidents that temporarily block the bottleneck. Drivers have general scheduling preferences for time spent at home and at work. They independently choose morning departure times from home to maximize expected utility without knowing whether an incident has occurred. The resulting departure time pattern may be compressed or dispersed according to whether or not the bottleneck is fully utilized throughout the departure period on days without incidents. For both the user equilibrium (UE) and the social optimum (SO) the departure pattern changes from compressed to dispersed when the probability of an incident becomes sufficiently high. The SO can be decentralized with a time-varying toll, but drivers are likely to be strictly worse off than in the UE unless they benefit from the toll revenues in some way. A numerical example is presented for illustration. Finally, the model is extended to encompass minor incidents in which the bottleneck retains some capacity during an incident.

AB - This paper analyzes traffic bottleneck congestion when drivers randomly cause incidents that temporarily block the bottleneck. Drivers have general scheduling preferences for time spent at home and at work. They independently choose morning departure times from home to maximize expected utility without knowing whether an incident has occurred. The resulting departure time pattern may be compressed or dispersed according to whether or not the bottleneck is fully utilized throughout the departure period on days without incidents. For both the user equilibrium (UE) and the social optimum (SO) the departure pattern changes from compressed to dispersed when the probability of an incident becomes sufficiently high. The SO can be decentralized with a time-varying toll, but drivers are likely to be strictly worse off than in the UE unless they benefit from the toll revenues in some way. A numerical example is presented for illustration. Finally, the model is extended to encompass minor incidents in which the bottleneck retains some capacity during an incident.

KW - Bottleneck model

KW - Congestion

KW - Departure-time decisions

KW - Evening commute

KW - Morning commute

KW - Scheduling utility

KW - Traffic incidents

UR - http://www.scopus.com/inward/record.url?scp=84881493518&partnerID=8YFLogxK

U2 - 10.1016/j.regsciurbeco.2013.07.002

DO - 10.1016/j.regsciurbeco.2013.07.002

M3 - Journal article

AN - SCOPUS:84881493518

VL - 43

SP - 764

EP - 782

JO - Regional Science and Urban Economics

JF - Regional Science and Urban Economics

SN - 0166-0462

IS - 5

ER -

ID: 181871580