The Volunteer’s Dilemma explains the Bystander Effect

Publikation: Working paperForskning

Standard

The Volunteer’s Dilemma explains the Bystander Effect. / Campos-Mercade, Pol.

2020.

Publikation: Working paperForskning

Harvard

Campos-Mercade, P 2020 'The Volunteer’s Dilemma explains the Bystander Effect'. <https://ssrn.com/abstract=3738664>

APA

Campos-Mercade, P. (2020). The Volunteer’s Dilemma explains the Bystander Effect. CEBI Working Paper Series Nr. 27/20 https://ssrn.com/abstract=3738664

Vancouver

Campos-Mercade P. The Volunteer’s Dilemma explains the Bystander Effect. 2020.

Author

Campos-Mercade, Pol. / The Volunteer’s Dilemma explains the Bystander Effect. 2020. (CEBI Working Paper Series; Nr. 27/20).

Bibtex

@techreport{d7c9eb3169e14c3798e44a7adb9284e2,
title = "The Volunteer{\textquoteright}s Dilemma explains the Bystander Effect",
abstract = "The bystander effect is the phenomenon that people are less likely to help others when they are in a group than when they are alone. The theoretical literature typically explains the bystander effect with the volunteer{\textquoteright}s dilemma: if providing help is equivalent to creating a public good, then bystanders could be less likely to help in groups because they free ride on the other bystanders. This paper uses a dynamic game to experimentally test such strategic interactions as an explanation for the bystander effect. In line with the predictions of the volunteer{\textquoteright}s dilemma, I find that bystanders help immediately when they are alone but help later and are less likely to help if they are part of a larger group. In contrast to the model{\textquoteright}s predictions, subjects in need of help are helped earlier and are more likely to be helped in larger groups. This finding can be accounted for in an extended model that includes both altruistic and selfish bystanders. The paper concludes that the volunteer{\textquoteright}s dilemma is a sensible way to model situations in which someone is in need of help, but it highlights the need to take heterogeneous social preferences into account.",
keywords = "volunteer{\textquoteright}s dilemma, bystander effect, helping behavior, group size, altruism, volunteer{\textquoteright}s dilemma, bystander effect, helping behavior, group size, altruism",
author = "Pol Campos-Mercade",
year = "2020",
language = "English",
series = "CEBI Working Paper Series",
number = "27/20",
type = "WorkingPaper",

}

RIS

TY - UNPB

T1 - The Volunteer’s Dilemma explains the Bystander Effect

AU - Campos-Mercade, Pol

PY - 2020

Y1 - 2020

N2 - The bystander effect is the phenomenon that people are less likely to help others when they are in a group than when they are alone. The theoretical literature typically explains the bystander effect with the volunteer’s dilemma: if providing help is equivalent to creating a public good, then bystanders could be less likely to help in groups because they free ride on the other bystanders. This paper uses a dynamic game to experimentally test such strategic interactions as an explanation for the bystander effect. In line with the predictions of the volunteer’s dilemma, I find that bystanders help immediately when they are alone but help later and are less likely to help if they are part of a larger group. In contrast to the model’s predictions, subjects in need of help are helped earlier and are more likely to be helped in larger groups. This finding can be accounted for in an extended model that includes both altruistic and selfish bystanders. The paper concludes that the volunteer’s dilemma is a sensible way to model situations in which someone is in need of help, but it highlights the need to take heterogeneous social preferences into account.

AB - The bystander effect is the phenomenon that people are less likely to help others when they are in a group than when they are alone. The theoretical literature typically explains the bystander effect with the volunteer’s dilemma: if providing help is equivalent to creating a public good, then bystanders could be less likely to help in groups because they free ride on the other bystanders. This paper uses a dynamic game to experimentally test such strategic interactions as an explanation for the bystander effect. In line with the predictions of the volunteer’s dilemma, I find that bystanders help immediately when they are alone but help later and are less likely to help if they are part of a larger group. In contrast to the model’s predictions, subjects in need of help are helped earlier and are more likely to be helped in larger groups. This finding can be accounted for in an extended model that includes both altruistic and selfish bystanders. The paper concludes that the volunteer’s dilemma is a sensible way to model situations in which someone is in need of help, but it highlights the need to take heterogeneous social preferences into account.

KW - volunteer’s dilemma

KW - bystander effect

KW - helping behavior

KW - group size

KW - altruism

KW - volunteer’s dilemma

KW - bystander effect

KW - helping behavior

KW - group size

KW - altruism

M3 - Working paper

T3 - CEBI Working Paper Series

BT - The Volunteer’s Dilemma explains the Bystander Effect

ER -

ID: 254665596