The volunteer's dilemma explains the bystander effect

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The volunteer's dilemma explains the bystander effect. / Campos-Mercade, Pol.

I: Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization, Bind 186, 2021, s. 646-661.

Publikation: Bidrag til tidsskriftTidsskriftartikelForskningfagfællebedømt

Harvard

Campos-Mercade, P 2021, 'The volunteer's dilemma explains the bystander effect', Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization, bind 186, s. 646-661. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jebo.2020.11.012

APA

Campos-Mercade, P. (2021). The volunteer's dilemma explains the bystander effect. Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization, 186, 646-661. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jebo.2020.11.012

Vancouver

Campos-Mercade P. The volunteer's dilemma explains the bystander effect. Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization. 2021;186:646-661. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jebo.2020.11.012

Author

Campos-Mercade, Pol. / The volunteer's dilemma explains the bystander effect. I: Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization. 2021 ; Bind 186. s. 646-661.

Bibtex

@article{5525861c17794411a174ae87c0116257,
title = "The volunteer's dilemma explains the bystander effect",
abstract = "The bystander effect is the phenomenon that people are less likely to help others when they are in a group than when they are alone. The theoretical literature typically explains the bystander effect with the volunteer's dilemma: if providing help is equivalent to creating a public good, then bystanders could be less likely to help in groups because they free ride on the other bystanders. This paper uses a dynamic game to experimentally test such strategic interactions as an explanation for the bystander effect. In line with the predictions of the volunteer's dilemma, I find that bystanders help immediately when they are alone but help later and are less likely to help if they are part of a larger group. In contrast to the model's predictions, subjects in need of help are helped earlier and are more likely to be helped in larger groups. This finding can be accounted for in an extended model that includes both altruistic and selfish bystanders. The paper concludes that the volunteer's dilemma is a sensible way to model situations in which someone is in need of help, but it highlights the need to take heterogeneous social preferences into account.",
keywords = "Altruism, Bystander effect, Group size, Helping behavior, Volunteer's dilemma",
author = "Pol Campos-Mercade",
year = "2021",
doi = "10.1016/j.jebo.2020.11.012",
language = "English",
volume = "186",
pages = "646--661",
journal = "Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization",
issn = "0167-2681",
publisher = "Elsevier",

}

RIS

TY - JOUR

T1 - The volunteer's dilemma explains the bystander effect

AU - Campos-Mercade, Pol

PY - 2021

Y1 - 2021

N2 - The bystander effect is the phenomenon that people are less likely to help others when they are in a group than when they are alone. The theoretical literature typically explains the bystander effect with the volunteer's dilemma: if providing help is equivalent to creating a public good, then bystanders could be less likely to help in groups because they free ride on the other bystanders. This paper uses a dynamic game to experimentally test such strategic interactions as an explanation for the bystander effect. In line with the predictions of the volunteer's dilemma, I find that bystanders help immediately when they are alone but help later and are less likely to help if they are part of a larger group. In contrast to the model's predictions, subjects in need of help are helped earlier and are more likely to be helped in larger groups. This finding can be accounted for in an extended model that includes both altruistic and selfish bystanders. The paper concludes that the volunteer's dilemma is a sensible way to model situations in which someone is in need of help, but it highlights the need to take heterogeneous social preferences into account.

AB - The bystander effect is the phenomenon that people are less likely to help others when they are in a group than when they are alone. The theoretical literature typically explains the bystander effect with the volunteer's dilemma: if providing help is equivalent to creating a public good, then bystanders could be less likely to help in groups because they free ride on the other bystanders. This paper uses a dynamic game to experimentally test such strategic interactions as an explanation for the bystander effect. In line with the predictions of the volunteer's dilemma, I find that bystanders help immediately when they are alone but help later and are less likely to help if they are part of a larger group. In contrast to the model's predictions, subjects in need of help are helped earlier and are more likely to be helped in larger groups. This finding can be accounted for in an extended model that includes both altruistic and selfish bystanders. The paper concludes that the volunteer's dilemma is a sensible way to model situations in which someone is in need of help, but it highlights the need to take heterogeneous social preferences into account.

KW - Altruism

KW - Bystander effect

KW - Group size

KW - Helping behavior

KW - Volunteer's dilemma

U2 - 10.1016/j.jebo.2020.11.012

DO - 10.1016/j.jebo.2020.11.012

M3 - Journal article

AN - SCOPUS:85097389067

VL - 186

SP - 646

EP - 661

JO - Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization

JF - Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization

SN - 0167-2681

ER -

ID: 257087873