The theory of voting and equilibria in noncooperative games

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Standard

The theory of voting and equilibria in noncooperative games. / Sloth, Birgitte.

I: Games and Economic Behavior, Bind 5, Nr. 1, 1993, s. 152-169.

Publikation: Bidrag til tidsskrift › Tidsskriftartikel › Forskning › fagfællebedømt

Harvard

Sloth, B 1993, 'The theory of voting and equilibria in noncooperative games', Games and Economic Behavior, bind 5, nr. 1, s. 152-169. https://doi.org/10.1006/game.1993.1008

APA

Sloth, B. (1993). The theory of voting and equilibria in noncooperative games. Games and Economic Behavior, 5(1), 152-169. https://doi.org/10.1006/game.1993.1008

Vancouver

Sloth B. The theory of voting and equilibria in noncooperative games. Games and Economic Behavior. 1993;5(1):152-169. https://doi.org/10.1006/game.1993.1008

Author

Sloth, Birgitte. / The theory of voting and equilibria in noncooperative games. I: Games and Economic Behavior. 1993 ; Bind 5, Nr. 1. s. 152-169.

Bibtex

@article{d2226e2074c611dbbee902004c4f4f50,
title = "The theory of voting and equilibria in noncooperative games",
abstract = "We consider the problem of modeling voting situations, seeking models and equilibrium concepts which are easier to incorporate in large sequential decision games than the models and solution concepts used by the {"}theory of voting.{"} It is demonstrated that one can avoid using very refined solution concepts (such as sophisticated outcomes), if voting is modeled like a roll-call, so each agent is assumed to know the votes of the agents who have voted before him",
author = "Birgitte Sloth",
note = "JEL classification: 025, 026",
year = "1993",
doi = "10.1006/game.1993.1008",
language = "English",
volume = "5",
pages = "152--169",
journal = "Games and Economic Behavior",
issn = "0899-8256",
publisher = "Academic Press",
number = "1",

}

RIS

TY - JOUR

T1 - The theory of voting and equilibria in noncooperative games

AU - Sloth, Birgitte

N1 - JEL classification: 025, 026

PY - 1993

Y1 - 1993

N2 - We consider the problem of modeling voting situations, seeking models and equilibrium concepts which are easier to incorporate in large sequential decision games than the models and solution concepts used by the "theory of voting." It is demonstrated that one can avoid using very refined solution concepts (such as sophisticated outcomes), if voting is modeled like a roll-call, so each agent is assumed to know the votes of the agents who have voted before him

AB - We consider the problem of modeling voting situations, seeking models and equilibrium concepts which are easier to incorporate in large sequential decision games than the models and solution concepts used by the "theory of voting." It is demonstrated that one can avoid using very refined solution concepts (such as sophisticated outcomes), if voting is modeled like a roll-call, so each agent is assumed to know the votes of the agents who have voted before him

U2 - 10.1006/game.1993.1008

DO - 10.1006/game.1993.1008

M3 - Journal article

VL - 5

SP - 152

EP - 169

JO - Games and Economic Behavior

JF - Games and Economic Behavior

SN - 0899-8256

IS - 1

ER -

ID: 157535