The marginal cost of public funds: hours of work versus labor force participation

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Standard

The marginal cost of public funds : hours of work versus labor force participation. / Kleven, Henrik Jacobsen; Kreiner, Claus Thustrup.

I: Journal of Public Economics, Bind 90, Nr. 10-11, 2006, s. 1955-1973.

Publikation: Bidrag til tidsskrift › Tidsskriftartikel › Forskning › fagfællebedømt

Harvard

Kleven, HJ & Kreiner, CT 2006, 'The marginal cost of public funds: hours of work versus labor force participation', Journal of Public Economics, bind 90, nr. 10-11, s. 1955-1973. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jpubeco.2006.03.006

APA

Kleven, H. J., & Kreiner, C. T. (2006). The marginal cost of public funds: hours of work versus labor force participation. Journal of Public Economics, 90(10-11), 1955-1973. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jpubeco.2006.03.006

Vancouver

Kleven HJ, Kreiner CT. The marginal cost of public funds: hours of work versus labor force participation. Journal of Public Economics. 2006;90(10-11):1955-1973. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jpubeco.2006.03.006

Author

Kleven, Henrik Jacobsen ; Kreiner, Claus Thustrup. / The marginal cost of public funds : hours of work versus labor force participation. I: Journal of Public Economics. 2006 ; Bind 90, Nr. 10-11. s. 1955-1973.

Bibtex

@article{4f146450ad3511dbbee902004c4f4f50,
title = "The marginal cost of public funds: hours of work versus labor force participation",
abstract = "This paper extends the theory and measurement of the marginal cost of public funds (MCF) to account for labor force participation responses. Our work is motivated by the emerging consensus in the empirical literature that extensive (participation) responses are more important than intensive (hours of work) responses. In the modelling of extensive responses, we argue that it is crucial to account for the presence of non-convexities created by fixed work costs. In a non-convex framework, tax and transfer reforms give rise to discrete participation responses generating first-order effects on government revenue. These revenue effects make the marginal cost of funds higher and we show numerically that the implications for MCF tend to be substantial",
keywords = "Faculty of Social Sciences, taxation, labor supply",
author = "Kleven, {Henrik Jacobsen} and Kreiner, {Claus Thustrup}",
note = "JEL Classification: H21, H41, J20",
year = "2006",
doi = "10.1016/j.jpubeco.2006.03.006",
language = "English",
volume = "90",
pages = "1955--1973",
journal = "Journal of Public Economics",
issn = "0047-2727",
publisher = "Elsevier",
number = "10-11",

}

RIS

TY - JOUR

T1 - The marginal cost of public funds

T2 - hours of work versus labor force participation

AU - Kleven, Henrik Jacobsen

AU - Kreiner, Claus Thustrup

N1 - JEL Classification: H21, H41, J20

PY - 2006

Y1 - 2006

N2 - This paper extends the theory and measurement of the marginal cost of public funds (MCF) to account for labor force participation responses. Our work is motivated by the emerging consensus in the empirical literature that extensive (participation) responses are more important than intensive (hours of work) responses. In the modelling of extensive responses, we argue that it is crucial to account for the presence of non-convexities created by fixed work costs. In a non-convex framework, tax and transfer reforms give rise to discrete participation responses generating first-order effects on government revenue. These revenue effects make the marginal cost of funds higher and we show numerically that the implications for MCF tend to be substantial

AB - This paper extends the theory and measurement of the marginal cost of public funds (MCF) to account for labor force participation responses. Our work is motivated by the emerging consensus in the empirical literature that extensive (participation) responses are more important than intensive (hours of work) responses. In the modelling of extensive responses, we argue that it is crucial to account for the presence of non-convexities created by fixed work costs. In a non-convex framework, tax and transfer reforms give rise to discrete participation responses generating first-order effects on government revenue. These revenue effects make the marginal cost of funds higher and we show numerically that the implications for MCF tend to be substantial

KW - Faculty of Social Sciences

KW - taxation

KW - labor supply

U2 - 10.1016/j.jpubeco.2006.03.006

DO - 10.1016/j.jpubeco.2006.03.006

M3 - Journal article

VL - 90

SP - 1955

EP - 1973

JO - Journal of Public Economics

JF - Journal of Public Economics

SN - 0047-2727

IS - 10-11

ER -

ID: 314359