The dynamics of urban traffic congestion and the price of parking

Publikation: Bidrag til tidsskriftTidsskriftartikelForskningfagfællebedømt

Standard

The dynamics of urban traffic congestion and the price of parking. / Fosgerau, Mogens; de Palma, André.

I: Journal of Public Economics, Bind 105, 09.2013, s. 106-115.

Publikation: Bidrag til tidsskriftTidsskriftartikelForskningfagfællebedømt

Harvard

Fosgerau, M & de Palma, A 2013, 'The dynamics of urban traffic congestion and the price of parking', Journal of Public Economics, bind 105, s. 106-115. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jpubeco.2013.06.008

APA

Fosgerau, M., & de Palma, A. (2013). The dynamics of urban traffic congestion and the price of parking. Journal of Public Economics, 105, 106-115. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jpubeco.2013.06.008

Vancouver

Fosgerau M, de Palma A. The dynamics of urban traffic congestion and the price of parking. Journal of Public Economics. 2013 sep.;105:106-115. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jpubeco.2013.06.008

Author

Fosgerau, Mogens ; de Palma, André. / The dynamics of urban traffic congestion and the price of parking. I: Journal of Public Economics. 2013 ; Bind 105. s. 106-115.

Bibtex

@article{431c5403b7e54cf7ae8d3ce2a914a047,
title = "The dynamics of urban traffic congestion and the price of parking",
abstract = "We consider commuting in a congested urban area. While an efficient time-varying toll may eliminate queuing, a toll may not be politically feasible. We study the benefit of a substitute: a parking fee at the workplace. An optimal time-varying parking fee is charged at zero rate when there is queuing and eliminates queuing when the rate is non-zero. Within certain limits, inability to charge some drivers for parking does not reduce the potential welfare gain. Drivers who cannot be charged travel when there is queuing. In some cases, interaction between morning and evening commutes can be exploited to remove queuing completely.",
keywords = "Congestion, Dynamic, Parking, Traffic, Urban",
author = "Mogens Fosgerau and {de Palma}, Andr{\'e}",
year = "2013",
month = sep,
doi = "10.1016/j.jpubeco.2013.06.008",
language = "English",
volume = "105",
pages = "106--115",
journal = "Journal of Public Economics",
issn = "0047-2727",
publisher = "Elsevier",

}

RIS

TY - JOUR

T1 - The dynamics of urban traffic congestion and the price of parking

AU - Fosgerau, Mogens

AU - de Palma, André

PY - 2013/9

Y1 - 2013/9

N2 - We consider commuting in a congested urban area. While an efficient time-varying toll may eliminate queuing, a toll may not be politically feasible. We study the benefit of a substitute: a parking fee at the workplace. An optimal time-varying parking fee is charged at zero rate when there is queuing and eliminates queuing when the rate is non-zero. Within certain limits, inability to charge some drivers for parking does not reduce the potential welfare gain. Drivers who cannot be charged travel when there is queuing. In some cases, interaction between morning and evening commutes can be exploited to remove queuing completely.

AB - We consider commuting in a congested urban area. While an efficient time-varying toll may eliminate queuing, a toll may not be politically feasible. We study the benefit of a substitute: a parking fee at the workplace. An optimal time-varying parking fee is charged at zero rate when there is queuing and eliminates queuing when the rate is non-zero. Within certain limits, inability to charge some drivers for parking does not reduce the potential welfare gain. Drivers who cannot be charged travel when there is queuing. In some cases, interaction between morning and evening commutes can be exploited to remove queuing completely.

KW - Congestion

KW - Dynamic

KW - Parking

KW - Traffic

KW - Urban

UR - http://www.scopus.com/inward/record.url?scp=84880683437&partnerID=8YFLogxK

U2 - 10.1016/j.jpubeco.2013.06.008

DO - 10.1016/j.jpubeco.2013.06.008

M3 - Journal article

AN - SCOPUS:84880683437

VL - 105

SP - 106

EP - 115

JO - Journal of Public Economics

JF - Journal of Public Economics

SN - 0047-2727

ER -

ID: 181871804