The Deterrence Effect of Whistleblowing

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Standard

The Deterrence Effect of Whistleblowing. / Johannesen, Niels; Stolper, Tim .

I: Journal of Law and Economics, Bind 64, Nr. 4, 11.2021, s. 821-855.

Publikation: Bidrag til tidsskrift › Tidsskriftartikel › Forskning › fagfællebedømt

Harvard

Johannesen, N & Stolper, T 2021, 'The Deterrence Effect of Whistleblowing', Journal of Law and Economics, bind 64, nr. 4, s. 821-855. https://doi.org/10.1086/715197

APA

Johannesen, N., & Stolper, T. (2021). The Deterrence Effect of Whistleblowing. Journal of Law and Economics, 64(4), 821-855. https://doi.org/10.1086/715197

Vancouver

Johannesen N, Stolper T. The Deterrence Effect of Whistleblowing. Journal of Law and Economics. 2021 nov.;64(4):821-855. https://doi.org/10.1086/715197

Author

Johannesen, Niels ; Stolper, Tim . / The Deterrence Effect of Whistleblowing. I: Journal of Law and Economics. 2021 ; Bind 64, Nr. 4. s. 821-855.

Bibtex

@article{ae4c984a28ae48cfb5b4d12b2427cdcd,
title = "The Deterrence Effect of Whistleblowing",
abstract = "We document that the first leak of customer information from a tax-haven bank caused a sudden flight of deposits from tax havens and a sharp decrease in the market value of banks known to be assisting with tax evasion. The loss of market value was largest for the banks most strongly involved in tax evasion. Subsequent leaks had qualitatively similar although smaller effects. Our findings suggest that whistleblowing in tax-haven banks deters offshore tax evaders by increasing the perceived risk of committing and assisting with tax evasion.",
author = "Niels Johannesen and Tim Stolper",
year = "2021",
month = nov,
doi = "10.1086/715197",
language = "English",
volume = "64",
pages = "821--855",
journal = "Journal of Law and Economics",
issn = "0022-2186",
publisher = "University of Chicago",
number = "4",

}

RIS

TY - JOUR

T1 - The Deterrence Effect of Whistleblowing

AU - Johannesen, Niels

AU - Stolper, Tim

PY - 2021/11

Y1 - 2021/11

N2 - We document that the first leak of customer information from a tax-haven bank caused a sudden flight of deposits from tax havens and a sharp decrease in the market value of banks known to be assisting with tax evasion. The loss of market value was largest for the banks most strongly involved in tax evasion. Subsequent leaks had qualitatively similar although smaller effects. Our findings suggest that whistleblowing in tax-haven banks deters offshore tax evaders by increasing the perceived risk of committing and assisting with tax evasion.

AB - We document that the first leak of customer information from a tax-haven bank caused a sudden flight of deposits from tax havens and a sharp decrease in the market value of banks known to be assisting with tax evasion. The loss of market value was largest for the banks most strongly involved in tax evasion. Subsequent leaks had qualitatively similar although smaller effects. Our findings suggest that whistleblowing in tax-haven banks deters offshore tax evaders by increasing the perceived risk of committing and assisting with tax evasion.

U2 - 10.1086/715197

DO - 10.1086/715197

M3 - Journal article

VL - 64

SP - 821

EP - 855

JO - Journal of Law and Economics

JF - Journal of Law and Economics

SN - 0022-2186

IS - 4

ER -

ID: 288341998