Strategic behavior and social outcomes in a bottleneck queue: Experimental evidence
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Strategic behavior and social outcomes in a bottleneck queue : Experimental evidence. / Breinbjerg, Jesper Breinbjerg; Sebald, Alexander Christopher; Østerdal, Lars Peter .
I: Review of Economic Design, Bind 20, Nr. 3, 2016, s. 207–236.Publikation: Bidrag til tidsskrift › Tidsskriftartikel › Forskning › fagfællebedømt
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TY - JOUR
T1 - Strategic behavior and social outcomes in a bottleneck queue
T2 - Experimental evidence
AU - Breinbjerg, Jesper Breinbjerg
AU - Sebald, Alexander Christopher
AU - Østerdal, Lars Peter
PY - 2016
Y1 - 2016
N2 - We theoretically and experimentally study the differential incentive effects of three well known queue disciplines in a strategic environment in which a bottleneck facility opens and impatient players decide when to arrive. For a class of three-player games, we derive equilibrium arrivals under the first-in-first-out (FIFO), last-in-first-out (LIFO), and service-in-random-order (SIRO) queue disciplines and compare these predictions to outcomes from a laboratory experiment. In line with our theoretical predictions, we find that people arrive with greater dispersion when participating under the LIFO discipline, whereas they tend to arrive immediately under FIFO and SIRO. As a consequence, shorter waiting times are obtained under LIFO as compared to FIFO and SIRO. However, while our theoretical predictions admit higher welfare under LIFO, this is not recovered experimentally as the queue disciplines provide similar welfare outcomes.
AB - We theoretically and experimentally study the differential incentive effects of three well known queue disciplines in a strategic environment in which a bottleneck facility opens and impatient players decide when to arrive. For a class of three-player games, we derive equilibrium arrivals under the first-in-first-out (FIFO), last-in-first-out (LIFO), and service-in-random-order (SIRO) queue disciplines and compare these predictions to outcomes from a laboratory experiment. In line with our theoretical predictions, we find that people arrive with greater dispersion when participating under the LIFO discipline, whereas they tend to arrive immediately under FIFO and SIRO. As a consequence, shorter waiting times are obtained under LIFO as compared to FIFO and SIRO. However, while our theoretical predictions admit higher welfare under LIFO, this is not recovered experimentally as the queue disciplines provide similar welfare outcomes.
U2 - 10.1007/s10058-016-0190-4
DO - 10.1007/s10058-016-0190-4
M3 - Journal article
VL - 20
SP - 207
EP - 236
JO - Review of Economic Design
JF - Review of Economic Design
SN - 1434-4742
IS - 3
ER -
ID: 162157222