State or nature? Endogenous formal versus informal sanctions in the voluntary provision of public goods

Publikation: Bidrag til tidsskrift › Tidsskriftartikel › Forskning › fagfællebedømt

Standard

State or nature? Endogenous formal versus informal sanctions in the voluntary provision of public goods. / Kamei, Kenju; Putterman, Louis; Tyran, Jean-Robert Karl.

I: Experimental Economics, Bind 18, Nr. 1, 2015, s. 38-65.

Publikation: Bidrag til tidsskrift › Tidsskriftartikel › Forskning › fagfællebedømt

Harvard

Kamei, K, Putterman, L & Tyran, J-RK 2015, 'State or nature? Endogenous formal versus informal sanctions in the voluntary provision of public goods', Experimental Economics, bind 18, nr. 1, s. 38-65. https://doi.org/10.1007/s10683-014-9405-0

APA

Kamei, K., Putterman, L., & Tyran, J-R. K. (2015). State or nature? Endogenous formal versus informal sanctions in the voluntary provision of public goods. Experimental Economics, 18(1), 38-65. https://doi.org/10.1007/s10683-014-9405-0

Vancouver

Kamei K, Putterman L, Tyran J-RK. State or nature? Endogenous formal versus informal sanctions in the voluntary provision of public goods. Experimental Economics. 2015;18(1):38-65. https://doi.org/10.1007/s10683-014-9405-0

Author

Kamei, Kenju ; Putterman, Louis ; Tyran, Jean-Robert Karl. / State or nature? Endogenous formal versus informal sanctions in the voluntary provision of public goods. I: Experimental Economics. 2015 ; Bind 18, Nr. 1. s. 38-65.

Bibtex

@article{99952e2bfdd74d3ca91e2d90fdedb7e3,
title = "State or nature? Endogenous formal versus informal sanctions in the voluntary provision of public goods",
abstract = "We investigate the endogenous formation of sanctioning institutions supposed to improve efficiency in the voluntary provision of public goods. Our paper parallels Markussen et al. (Rev Econ Stud 81:301–324, 2014) in that our experimental subjects vote over formal versus informal sanctions, but it goes beyond that paper by endogenizing the formal sanction scheme. We find that self-determined formal sanctions schemes are popular and efficient when they carry no up-front cost, but as in Markussen et al. informal sanctions are more popular and efficient than formal sanctions when adopting the latter entails such a cost. Practice improves the performance of sanction schemes: they become more targeted and deterrent with learning. Voters{\textquoteright} characteristics, including their tendency to engage in perverse informal sanctioning, help to predict individual voting.",
author = "Kenju Kamei and Louis Putterman and Tyran, {Jean-Robert Karl}",
note = "JEL Classification: C92, C91, D03, D71, H4",
year = "2015",
doi = "10.1007/s10683-014-9405-0",
language = "English",
volume = "18",
pages = "38--65",
journal = "Experimental Economics",
issn = "1386-4157",
publisher = "Springer",
number = "1",

}

RIS

TY - JOUR

T1 - State or nature? Endogenous formal versus informal sanctions in the voluntary provision of public goods

AU - Kamei, Kenju

AU - Putterman, Louis

AU - Tyran, Jean-Robert Karl

N1 - JEL Classification: C92, C91, D03, D71, H4

PY - 2015

Y1 - 2015

N2 - We investigate the endogenous formation of sanctioning institutions supposed to improve efficiency in the voluntary provision of public goods. Our paper parallels Markussen et al. (Rev Econ Stud 81:301–324, 2014) in that our experimental subjects vote over formal versus informal sanctions, but it goes beyond that paper by endogenizing the formal sanction scheme. We find that self-determined formal sanctions schemes are popular and efficient when they carry no up-front cost, but as in Markussen et al. informal sanctions are more popular and efficient than formal sanctions when adopting the latter entails such a cost. Practice improves the performance of sanction schemes: they become more targeted and deterrent with learning. Voters’ characteristics, including their tendency to engage in perverse informal sanctioning, help to predict individual voting.

AB - We investigate the endogenous formation of sanctioning institutions supposed to improve efficiency in the voluntary provision of public goods. Our paper parallels Markussen et al. (Rev Econ Stud 81:301–324, 2014) in that our experimental subjects vote over formal versus informal sanctions, but it goes beyond that paper by endogenizing the formal sanction scheme. We find that self-determined formal sanctions schemes are popular and efficient when they carry no up-front cost, but as in Markussen et al. informal sanctions are more popular and efficient than formal sanctions when adopting the latter entails such a cost. Practice improves the performance of sanction schemes: they become more targeted and deterrent with learning. Voters’ characteristics, including their tendency to engage in perverse informal sanctioning, help to predict individual voting.

U2 - 10.1007/s10683-014-9405-0

DO - 10.1007/s10683-014-9405-0

M3 - Journal article

VL - 18

SP - 38

EP - 65

JO - Experimental Economics

JF - Experimental Economics

SN - 1386-4157

IS - 1

ER -

ID: 128680929