Sparking curiosity or tipping the scales? Targeted advertising with consumer learning

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Sparking curiosity or tipping the scales? Targeted advertising with consumer learning. / Matveenko, Andrei; Starkov, Egor.

I: Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Bind 213, 102885, 09.2023, s. 172-192.

Publikation: Bidrag til tidsskriftTidsskriftartikelForskningfagfællebedømt

Harvard

Matveenko, A & Starkov, E 2023, 'Sparking curiosity or tipping the scales? Targeted advertising with consumer learning', Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, bind 213, 102885, s. 172-192. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jebo.2023.07.008

APA

Matveenko, A., & Starkov, E. (2023). Sparking curiosity or tipping the scales? Targeted advertising with consumer learning. Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, 213, 172-192. [102885]. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jebo.2023.07.008

Vancouver

Matveenko A, Starkov E. Sparking curiosity or tipping the scales? Targeted advertising with consumer learning. Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization. 2023 sep.;213:172-192. 102885. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jebo.2023.07.008

Author

Matveenko, Andrei ; Starkov, Egor. / Sparking curiosity or tipping the scales? Targeted advertising with consumer learning. I: Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization. 2023 ; Bind 213. s. 172-192.

Bibtex

@article{98e8401a98c04429b2df927325fc1402,
title = "Sparking curiosity or tipping the scales? Targeted advertising with consumer learning",
abstract = "This paper argues, in the context of targeted advertising, that receivers{\textquoteright} ability to independently acquire information has a non-trivial impact on the sender{\textquoteright}s optimal disclosure strategy. In our model, a monopolist has an opportunity to launch an advertising campaign and chooses a targeting strategy – which consumers to send its advertisement to. The consumers are uncertain about and heterogeneous in their valuations of the product, and can engage in costly learning about their true valuations. We discover that the firm generally prefers to target consumers who are either indifferent between ignoring and investigating the product, or between investigating and buying it unconditionally. If the firm is uncertain about the consumer appeal of its product, it targets these two distinct groups of consumers simultaneously but may ignore all consumers in between.",
author = "Andrei Matveenko and Egor Starkov",
year = "2023",
month = sep,
doi = "10.1016/j.jebo.2023.07.008",
language = "English",
volume = "213",
pages = "172--192",
journal = "Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization",
issn = "0167-2681",
publisher = "Elsevier",

}

RIS

TY - JOUR

T1 - Sparking curiosity or tipping the scales? Targeted advertising with consumer learning

AU - Matveenko, Andrei

AU - Starkov, Egor

PY - 2023/9

Y1 - 2023/9

N2 - This paper argues, in the context of targeted advertising, that receivers’ ability to independently acquire information has a non-trivial impact on the sender’s optimal disclosure strategy. In our model, a monopolist has an opportunity to launch an advertising campaign and chooses a targeting strategy – which consumers to send its advertisement to. The consumers are uncertain about and heterogeneous in their valuations of the product, and can engage in costly learning about their true valuations. We discover that the firm generally prefers to target consumers who are either indifferent between ignoring and investigating the product, or between investigating and buying it unconditionally. If the firm is uncertain about the consumer appeal of its product, it targets these two distinct groups of consumers simultaneously but may ignore all consumers in between.

AB - This paper argues, in the context of targeted advertising, that receivers’ ability to independently acquire information has a non-trivial impact on the sender’s optimal disclosure strategy. In our model, a monopolist has an opportunity to launch an advertising campaign and chooses a targeting strategy – which consumers to send its advertisement to. The consumers are uncertain about and heterogeneous in their valuations of the product, and can engage in costly learning about their true valuations. We discover that the firm generally prefers to target consumers who are either indifferent between ignoring and investigating the product, or between investigating and buying it unconditionally. If the firm is uncertain about the consumer appeal of its product, it targets these two distinct groups of consumers simultaneously but may ignore all consumers in between.

U2 - 10.1016/j.jebo.2023.07.008

DO - 10.1016/j.jebo.2023.07.008

M3 - Journal article

VL - 213

SP - 172

EP - 192

JO - Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization

JF - Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization

SN - 0167-2681

M1 - 102885

ER -

ID: 362340662