TY - UNPB

T1 - Social Ties and Coordination on Negative Reciprocity

T2 - The Role of Affect

AU - Reuben, Ernesto

AU - van Winden, Frans

N1 - JEL Classification: Z13, D74, C92, D63

PY - 2006

Y1 - 2006

N2 - This is an experimental study of a three-player power-to-take game where a proposer is matched with two responders. We compare a treatment in which subjects are anonymous to each other (strangers) with one in which responders know each other from outside the lab (friends). We focus on the responders’ decisions, beliefs, and emotions. We find that friends punish the proposer more than strangers, and that they are more likely to coordinate their punishment (without communication). Both punishment and coordination are explained by the responders’ emotional reactions. Furthermore, the responders’ expectations are better predictors of emotions and destruction than their fairness perceptions

AB - This is an experimental study of a three-player power-to-take game where a proposer is matched with two responders. We compare a treatment in which subjects are anonymous to each other (strangers) with one in which responders know each other from outside the lab (friends). We focus on the responders’ decisions, beliefs, and emotions. We find that friends punish the proposer more than strangers, and that they are more likely to coordinate their punishment (without communication). Both punishment and coordination are explained by the responders’ emotional reactions. Furthermore, the responders’ expectations are better predictors of emotions and destruction than their fairness perceptions

M3 - Working paper

BT - Social Ties and Coordination on Negative Reciprocity

PB - Department of Economics, University of Copenhagen

CY - Cph.

ER -