Social preferences and strategic uncertainty: an experiment on markets and contracts

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Social preferences and strategic uncertainty : an experiment on markets and contracts. / Cabrales, Antonio; Miniaci, Raffaele; Piovesan, Marco; Ponti, Giovanni.

I: American Economic Review (Print Edition), Bind 100, Nr. 5, 2010, s. 2261–2278.

Publikation: Bidrag til tidsskrift › Tidsskriftartikel › Forskning › fagfællebedømt

Harvard

Cabrales, A, Miniaci, R, Piovesan, M & Ponti, G 2010, 'Social preferences and strategic uncertainty: an experiment on markets and contracts', American Economic Review (Print Edition), bind 100, nr. 5, s. 2261–2278. https://doi.org/10.1257/aer.100.5.2261

APA

Cabrales, A., Miniaci, R., Piovesan, M., & Ponti, G. (2010). Social preferences and strategic uncertainty: an experiment on markets and contracts. American Economic Review (Print Edition), 100(5), 2261–2278. https://doi.org/10.1257/aer.100.5.2261

Vancouver

Cabrales A, Miniaci R, Piovesan M, Ponti G. Social preferences and strategic uncertainty: an experiment on markets and contracts. American Economic Review (Print Edition). 2010;100(5):2261–2278. https://doi.org/10.1257/aer.100.5.2261

Author

Cabrales, Antonio ; Miniaci, Raffaele ; Piovesan, Marco ; Ponti, Giovanni. / Social preferences and strategic uncertainty : an experiment on markets and contracts. I: American Economic Review (Print Edition). 2010 ; Bind 100, Nr. 5. s. 2261–2278.

Bibtex

@article{31ddaab0cc8d11df825b000ea68e967b,
title = "Social preferences and strategic uncertainty: an experiment on markets and contracts",
abstract = "This paper reports a three-phase experiment on a stylized labor market. In the first two phases, agents face simple games, which we use to estimate subjects' social and reciprocity concerns. In the last phase, four principals compete by offering agents a contract from a fixed menu. Then, agents {"}choose to work{"} for a principal by selecting one of the available contracts. We find that (i) (heterogeneous) social preferences are significant determinants of choices, (ii) for both principals and agents, strategic uncertainty aversion is a stronger determinant of choices than fairness, and (iii) agents display a marked propensity to work for principals with similar distributional concerns.",
author = "Antonio Cabrales and Raffaele Miniaci and Marco Piovesan and Giovanni Ponti",
note = "JEL classification: JEL D82, D86, J41",
year = "2010",
doi = "10.1257/aer.100.5.2261",
language = "English",
volume = "100",
pages = "2261–2278",
journal = "American Economic Review",
issn = "0002-8282",
publisher = "American Economic Association",
number = "5",

}

RIS

TY - JOUR

T1 - Social preferences and strategic uncertainty

T2 - an experiment on markets and contracts

AU - Cabrales, Antonio

AU - Miniaci, Raffaele

AU - Piovesan, Marco

AU - Ponti, Giovanni

N1 - JEL classification: JEL D82, D86, J41

PY - 2010

Y1 - 2010

N2 - This paper reports a three-phase experiment on a stylized labor market. In the first two phases, agents face simple games, which we use to estimate subjects' social and reciprocity concerns. In the last phase, four principals compete by offering agents a contract from a fixed menu. Then, agents "choose to work" for a principal by selecting one of the available contracts. We find that (i) (heterogeneous) social preferences are significant determinants of choices, (ii) for both principals and agents, strategic uncertainty aversion is a stronger determinant of choices than fairness, and (iii) agents display a marked propensity to work for principals with similar distributional concerns.

AB - This paper reports a three-phase experiment on a stylized labor market. In the first two phases, agents face simple games, which we use to estimate subjects' social and reciprocity concerns. In the last phase, four principals compete by offering agents a contract from a fixed menu. Then, agents "choose to work" for a principal by selecting one of the available contracts. We find that (i) (heterogeneous) social preferences are significant determinants of choices, (ii) for both principals and agents, strategic uncertainty aversion is a stronger determinant of choices than fairness, and (iii) agents display a marked propensity to work for principals with similar distributional concerns.

U2 - 10.1257/aer.100.5.2261

DO - 10.1257/aer.100.5.2261

M3 - Journal article

VL - 100

SP - 2261

EP - 2278

JO - American Economic Review

JF - American Economic Review

SN - 0002-8282

IS - 5

ER -

ID: 22290571