Sequencing R&D Decisions in a Two-Period Duopoly with Spillovers

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Standard

Sequencing R&D Decisions in a Two-Period Duopoly with Spillovers. / Amir, Madjid; Amir, Rabah; Jin, Jim.

I: Economic Theory, Bind 15, Nr. 2, 2000, s. 297-317.

Publikation: Bidrag til tidsskrift › Tidsskriftartikel › Forskning › fagfællebedømt

Harvard

Amir, M, Amir, R & Jin, J 2000, 'Sequencing R&D Decisions in a Two-Period Duopoly with Spillovers', Economic Theory, bind 15, nr. 2, s. 297-317. https://doi.org/10.1007/s001990050014

APA

Amir, M., Amir, R., & Jin, J. (2000). Sequencing R&D Decisions in a Two-Period Duopoly with Spillovers. Economic Theory, 15(2), 297-317. https://doi.org/10.1007/s001990050014

Vancouver

Amir M, Amir R, Jin J. Sequencing R&D Decisions in a Two-Period Duopoly with Spillovers. Economic Theory. 2000;15(2):297-317. https://doi.org/10.1007/s001990050014

Author

Amir, Madjid ; Amir, Rabah ; Jin, Jim. / Sequencing R&D Decisions in a Two-Period Duopoly with Spillovers. I: Economic Theory. 2000 ; Bind 15, Nr. 2. s. 297-317.

Bibtex

@article{3c4f2cd074c611dbbee902004c4f4f50,
title = "Sequencing R&D Decisions in a Two-Period Duopoly with Spillovers",
abstract = "We compare simultaneous versus sequential moves in R&D decisions within an asymmetric R&D/Cournot model with linear demand (for differentiated products), general R&D costs, and spillovers. Simultaneous play and sequential play (with and without a specified leader) can emerge as appropriate formulations, depending on the ratios of spillover rate over demand cross-slope, but not on R&D efficiency. When at least one ratio is above 1/2, a sequential solution mitigates competition and leads to higher profits for each firm, and to higher social welfare. When uniquely specified, the stronger firm emerges as the R&D first-mover",
author = "Madjid Amir and Rabah Amir and Jim Jin",
note = "JEL Classification: O32, L13",
year = "2000",
doi = "10.1007/s001990050014",
language = "English",
volume = "15",
pages = "297--317",
journal = "Economic Theory",
issn = "0938-2259",
publisher = "Springer",
number = "2",

}

RIS

TY - JOUR

T1 - Sequencing R&D Decisions in a Two-Period Duopoly with Spillovers

AU - Amir, Madjid

AU - Amir, Rabah

AU - Jin, Jim

N1 - JEL Classification: O32, L13

PY - 2000

Y1 - 2000

N2 - We compare simultaneous versus sequential moves in R&D decisions within an asymmetric R&D/Cournot model with linear demand (for differentiated products), general R&D costs, and spillovers. Simultaneous play and sequential play (with and without a specified leader) can emerge as appropriate formulations, depending on the ratios of spillover rate over demand cross-slope, but not on R&D efficiency. When at least one ratio is above 1/2, a sequential solution mitigates competition and leads to higher profits for each firm, and to higher social welfare. When uniquely specified, the stronger firm emerges as the R&D first-mover

AB - We compare simultaneous versus sequential moves in R&D decisions within an asymmetric R&D/Cournot model with linear demand (for differentiated products), general R&D costs, and spillovers. Simultaneous play and sequential play (with and without a specified leader) can emerge as appropriate formulations, depending on the ratios of spillover rate over demand cross-slope, but not on R&D efficiency. When at least one ratio is above 1/2, a sequential solution mitigates competition and leads to higher profits for each firm, and to higher social welfare. When uniquely specified, the stronger firm emerges as the R&D first-mover

U2 - 10.1007/s001990050014

DO - 10.1007/s001990050014

M3 - Journal article

VL - 15

SP - 297

EP - 317

JO - Economic Theory

JF - Economic Theory

SN - 0938-2259

IS - 2

ER -

ID: 148627