TY - JOUR

T1 - R&D returns, market structure and research joint ventures

AU - Amir, Rabah

N1 - JEL Classification: D43, L13, O30

PY - 2000

Y1 - 2000

N2 - A two-period symmetric Cournot duopoly with linear demand and costs is analyzed under linear (or more general) returns to scale in process R&D. Subgame-perfect equilibrium may call for one firm to fully innovate while the other firm remains just as before. The outcome is a polar duopoly or monopoly (one firm endogenously exiting). Two research joint venture schemes and the noncooperative solution are compared. Due to built-in symmetry, a joint lab does not always lead to the best performance. Overall, our findings differ quite substantially from those based on strongly decreasing R&D returns and symmetric outcomes

AB - A two-period symmetric Cournot duopoly with linear demand and costs is analyzed under linear (or more general) returns to scale in process R&D. Subgame-perfect equilibrium may call for one firm to fully innovate while the other firm remains just as before. The outcome is a polar duopoly or monopoly (one firm endogenously exiting). Two research joint venture schemes and the noncooperative solution are compared. Due to built-in symmetry, a joint lab does not always lead to the best performance. Overall, our findings differ quite substantially from those based on strongly decreasing R&D returns and symmetric outcomes

M3 - Journal article

VL - 156

SP - 583

EP - 598

JO - Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics

JF - Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics

SN - 0932-4569

IS - 4

ER -