Public Goods and Voting on Formal Sanction Schemes: An Experiment
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Public Goods and Voting on Formal Sanction Schemes: An Experiment. / Putterman, Louis G.; Tyran, Jean-Robert; Kamei, Kenju.
I: Univ. of Copenhagen Dept. of Economics Discussion Paper, 13.01.2010.Publikation: Bidrag til tidsskrift › Tidsskriftartikel › Forskning
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TY - JOUR
T1 - Public Goods and Voting on Formal Sanction Schemes: An Experiment
AU - Putterman, Louis G.
AU - Tyran, Jean-Robert
AU - Kamei, Kenju
PY - 2010/1/13
Y1 - 2010/1/13
N2 - The burgeoning literature on the use of sanctions to support public goods provision has largely neglected the use of formal or centralized sanctions. We let subjects playing a linear public goods game vote on the parameters of a formal sanction scheme capable both of resolving and of exacerbating the free-rider problem, depending on parameter settings. Most groups quickly learned to choose parameters inducing efficient outcomes. But despite uniform money payoffs implying common interest in those parameters, voting patterns suggest significant influence of cooperative orientation, political attitudes, and of gender and intelligence.
AB - The burgeoning literature on the use of sanctions to support public goods provision has largely neglected the use of formal or centralized sanctions. We let subjects playing a linear public goods game vote on the parameters of a formal sanction scheme capable both of resolving and of exacerbating the free-rider problem, depending on parameter settings. Most groups quickly learned to choose parameters inducing efficient outcomes. But despite uniform money payoffs implying common interest in those parameters, voting patterns suggest significant influence of cooperative orientation, political attitudes, and of gender and intelligence.
KW - public good
KW - voluntary contribution
KW - formal sanction
KW - experiment
KW - penalty
KW - voting
U2 - 10.2139/ssrn.1535201
DO - 10.2139/ssrn.1535201
M3 - Journal article
JO - Univ. of Copenhagen Dept. of Economics Discussion Paper
JF - Univ. of Copenhagen Dept. of Economics Discussion Paper
ER -
ID: 241647132