Public goods and voting on formal sanction schemes

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Standard

Public goods and voting on formal sanction schemes. / Putterman, Louis; Tyran, Jean-Robert Karl; Kamei, Kenju .

I: Journal of Public Economics, Bind 95, Nr. 9-10, 2011, s. 1213–1222.

Publikation: Bidrag til tidsskrift › Tidsskriftartikel › Forskning › fagfællebedømt

Harvard

Putterman, L, Tyran, J-RK & Kamei, K 2011, 'Public goods and voting on formal sanction schemes', Journal of Public Economics, bind 95, nr. 9-10, s. 1213–1222. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jpubeco.2011.05.001

APA

Putterman, L., Tyran, J-R. K., & Kamei, K. (2011). Public goods and voting on formal sanction schemes. Journal of Public Economics, 95(9-10), 1213–1222. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jpubeco.2011.05.001

Vancouver

Putterman L, Tyran J-RK, Kamei K. Public goods and voting on formal sanction schemes. Journal of Public Economics. 2011;95(9-10):1213–1222. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jpubeco.2011.05.001

Author

Putterman, Louis ; Tyran, Jean-Robert Karl ; Kamei, Kenju . / Public goods and voting on formal sanction schemes. I: Journal of Public Economics. 2011 ; Bind 95, Nr. 9-10. s. 1213–1222.

Bibtex

@article{30296ada36fb4b04a366b40af28e5615,
title = "Public goods and voting on formal sanction schemes",
abstract = "The burgeoning literature on the use of sanctions to support the provision of public goods has largely neglected the use of formal or centralized sanctions. We let subjects playing a linear public goods game vote on the parameters of a formal sanction scheme capable of either resolving or exacerbating the free-rider problem, depending on parameter settings. Most groups quickly learned to choose parameters inducing efficient outcomes. We find that cooperative orientation, political attitude, gender and intelligence have a small but sometimes significant influence on voting.",
author = "Louis Putterman and Tyran, {Jean-Robert Karl} and Kenju Kamei",
note = "JEL classification: C91; C92; D71; D72; H41 ",
year = "2011",
doi = "10.1016/j.jpubeco.2011.05.001",
language = "English",
volume = "95",
pages = "1213–1222",
journal = "Journal of Public Economics",
issn = "0047-2727",
publisher = "Elsevier",
number = "9-10",

}

RIS

TY - JOUR

T1 - Public goods and voting on formal sanction schemes

AU - Putterman, Louis

AU - Tyran, Jean-Robert Karl

AU - Kamei, Kenju

N1 - JEL classification: C91; C92; D71; D72; H41

PY - 2011

Y1 - 2011

N2 - The burgeoning literature on the use of sanctions to support the provision of public goods has largely neglected the use of formal or centralized sanctions. We let subjects playing a linear public goods game vote on the parameters of a formal sanction scheme capable of either resolving or exacerbating the free-rider problem, depending on parameter settings. Most groups quickly learned to choose parameters inducing efficient outcomes. We find that cooperative orientation, political attitude, gender and intelligence have a small but sometimes significant influence on voting.

AB - The burgeoning literature on the use of sanctions to support the provision of public goods has largely neglected the use of formal or centralized sanctions. We let subjects playing a linear public goods game vote on the parameters of a formal sanction scheme capable of either resolving or exacerbating the free-rider problem, depending on parameter settings. Most groups quickly learned to choose parameters inducing efficient outcomes. We find that cooperative orientation, political attitude, gender and intelligence have a small but sometimes significant influence on voting.

U2 - 10.1016/j.jpubeco.2011.05.001

DO - 10.1016/j.jpubeco.2011.05.001

M3 - Journal article

VL - 95

SP - 1213

EP - 1222

JO - Journal of Public Economics

JF - Journal of Public Economics

SN - 0047-2727

IS - 9-10

ER -

ID: 36061980