Public Funding of Political Parties

Publikation: Working paperForskning

Standard

Public Funding of Political Parties. / Ortuno-Ortin, Ignacio; Schultz, Christian.

University of Munich, 2000.

Publikation: Working paperForskning

Harvard

Ortuno-Ortin, I & Schultz, C 2000 'Public Funding of Political Parties' University of Munich. <http://www.cesifo-group.de/DocCIDL/cesifo_wp368.pdf>

APA

Ortuno-Ortin, I., & Schultz, C. (2000). Public Funding of Political Parties. University of Munich. http://www.cesifo-group.de/DocCIDL/cesifo_wp368.pdf

Vancouver

Ortuno-Ortin I, Schultz C. Public Funding of Political Parties. University of Munich. 2000.

Author

Ortuno-Ortin, Ignacio ; Schultz, Christian. / Public Funding of Political Parties. University of Munich, 2000.

Bibtex

@techreport{6bcd217074c011dbbee902004c4f4f50,
title = "Public Funding of Political Parties",
abstract = "This paper concerns public funding of parties. Parteis receive public funds depending on their vote share. Funds finance electoral campaigns. Two cases are investigated. In the first, some voters are policy motivated and some are ?impressionable? ? their vote depends directly on campaign expenditures. In the second, campaigning is informative and all voters are policy motivated. Public funds increase policy convergence in both cases. The effect is larger, the more funding depends on vote shares. When campaigns are informative, there may be multiple euqilibria. Intuitively, a large party can stay large since it receives large funds",
author = "Ignacio Ortuno-Ortin and Christian Schultz",
note = "JEL Classification: D72",
year = "2000",
language = "English",
publisher = "University of Munich",
type = "WorkingPaper",
institution = "University of Munich",

}

RIS

TY - UNPB

T1 - Public Funding of Political Parties

AU - Ortuno-Ortin, Ignacio

AU - Schultz, Christian

N1 - JEL Classification: D72

PY - 2000

Y1 - 2000

N2 - This paper concerns public funding of parties. Parteis receive public funds depending on their vote share. Funds finance electoral campaigns. Two cases are investigated. In the first, some voters are policy motivated and some are ?impressionable? ? their vote depends directly on campaign expenditures. In the second, campaigning is informative and all voters are policy motivated. Public funds increase policy convergence in both cases. The effect is larger, the more funding depends on vote shares. When campaigns are informative, there may be multiple euqilibria. Intuitively, a large party can stay large since it receives large funds

AB - This paper concerns public funding of parties. Parteis receive public funds depending on their vote share. Funds finance electoral campaigns. Two cases are investigated. In the first, some voters are policy motivated and some are ?impressionable? ? their vote depends directly on campaign expenditures. In the second, campaigning is informative and all voters are policy motivated. Public funds increase policy convergence in both cases. The effect is larger, the more funding depends on vote shares. When campaigns are informative, there may be multiple euqilibria. Intuitively, a large party can stay large since it receives large funds

M3 - Working paper

BT - Public Funding of Political Parties

PB - University of Munich

ER -

ID: 45384