Profit maximization mitigates competition
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Profit maximization mitigates competition. / Dierker, Egbert; Grodal, Birgit.
I: Economic Theory, Bind 7, Nr. 1, 1996, s. 139-160.Publikation: Bidrag til tidsskrift › Tidsskriftartikel › Forskning › fagfællebedømt
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TY - JOUR
T1 - Profit maximization mitigates competition
AU - Dierker, Egbert
AU - Grodal, Birgit
PY - 1996
Y1 - 1996
N2 - We consider oligopolistic markets in which the notion of shareholders' utility is well-defined and compare the Bertrand-Nash equilibria in case of utility maximization with those under the usual profit maximization hypothesis. Our main result states that profit maximization leads to less price competition than utility maximization. Since profit maximization tends to raise prices, it may be regarded as beneficial for the owners as a whole. Moreover, if profit maximization is a good proxy for utility maximization, then there is no need for a general equilibrium analysis that takes the distribution of profits among consumers fully into account and partial equilibrium analysis suffices
AB - We consider oligopolistic markets in which the notion of shareholders' utility is well-defined and compare the Bertrand-Nash equilibria in case of utility maximization with those under the usual profit maximization hypothesis. Our main result states that profit maximization leads to less price competition than utility maximization. Since profit maximization tends to raise prices, it may be regarded as beneficial for the owners as a whole. Moreover, if profit maximization is a good proxy for utility maximization, then there is no need for a general equilibrium analysis that takes the distribution of profits among consumers fully into account and partial equilibrium analysis suffices
U2 - 10.1007/BF01212187
DO - 10.1007/BF01212187
M3 - Journal article
VL - 7
SP - 139
EP - 160
JO - Economic Theory
JF - Economic Theory
SN - 0938-2259
IS - 1
ER -
ID: 3047375