Professional advice

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Standard

Professional advice. / Ottaviani, Marco; Sørensen, Peter Norman.

I: Journal of Economic Theory, Bind 126, Nr. 1, 2006, s. 120-142.

Publikation: Bidrag til tidsskrift › Tidsskriftartikel › Forskning › fagfællebedømt

Harvard

Ottaviani, M & Sørensen, PN 2006, 'Professional advice', Journal of Economic Theory, bind 126, nr. 1, s. 120-142. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jet.2004.08.005

APA

Ottaviani, M., & Sørensen, P. N. (2006). Professional advice. Journal of Economic Theory, 126(1), 120-142. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jet.2004.08.005

Vancouver

Ottaviani M, Sørensen PN. Professional advice. Journal of Economic Theory. 2006;126(1):120-142. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jet.2004.08.005

Author

Ottaviani, Marco ; Sørensen, Peter Norman. / Professional advice. I: Journal of Economic Theory. 2006 ; Bind 126, Nr. 1. s. 120-142.

Bibtex

@article{c5d36b608a9c11dbbee902004c4f4f50,
title = "Professional advice",
abstract = "This paper studies strategic communication by an expert who is concerned about appearing to be well informed. The expert is assumed to observe a private signal with a simple and particularly tractable (multiplicative linear) structure. The quality of the expert's information is evaluated on the basis of the advice given and the realized state of the world. In equilibrium of this reputational cheap-talk game, no more than two messages are effectively reported. The model is extended to consider sequential communication by experts with conditionally independent signals. In the long run, learning is incomplete and herd behavior arises",
keywords = "Faculty of Social Sciences, reputation, cheap talk, herding",
author = "Marco Ottaviani and S{\o}rensen, {Peter Norman}",
note = "JEL Classification: D82, D83, D72",
year = "2006",
doi = "10.1016/j.jet.2004.08.005",
language = "English",
volume = "126",
pages = "120--142",
journal = "Journal of Economic Theory",
issn = "0022-0531",
publisher = "Academic Press",
number = "1",

}

RIS

TY - JOUR

T1 - Professional advice

AU - Ottaviani, Marco

AU - Sørensen, Peter Norman

N1 - JEL Classification: D82, D83, D72

PY - 2006

Y1 - 2006

N2 - This paper studies strategic communication by an expert who is concerned about appearing to be well informed. The expert is assumed to observe a private signal with a simple and particularly tractable (multiplicative linear) structure. The quality of the expert's information is evaluated on the basis of the advice given and the realized state of the world. In equilibrium of this reputational cheap-talk game, no more than two messages are effectively reported. The model is extended to consider sequential communication by experts with conditionally independent signals. In the long run, learning is incomplete and herd behavior arises

AB - This paper studies strategic communication by an expert who is concerned about appearing to be well informed. The expert is assumed to observe a private signal with a simple and particularly tractable (multiplicative linear) structure. The quality of the expert's information is evaluated on the basis of the advice given and the realized state of the world. In equilibrium of this reputational cheap-talk game, no more than two messages are effectively reported. The model is extended to consider sequential communication by experts with conditionally independent signals. In the long run, learning is incomplete and herd behavior arises

KW - Faculty of Social Sciences

KW - reputation

KW - cheap talk

KW - herding

U2 - 10.1016/j.jet.2004.08.005

DO - 10.1016/j.jet.2004.08.005

M3 - Journal article

VL - 126

SP - 120

EP - 142

JO - Journal of Economic Theory

JF - Journal of Economic Theory

SN - 0022-0531

IS - 1

ER -

ID: 314080