Price competition, level-k theory and communication

Publikation: Bidrag til tidsskrift › Tidsskriftartikel › Forskning › fagfællebedømt

Standard

Price competition, level-k theory and communication. / Wengström, Erik Roland.

I: Economics Bulletin, Bind 3, Nr. 66, 2008.

Publikation: Bidrag til tidsskrift › Tidsskriftartikel › Forskning › fagfællebedømt

Harvard

Wengström, ER 2008, 'Price competition, level-k theory and communication', Economics Bulletin, bind 3, nr. 66. <http://economicsbulletin.vanderbilt.edu/DisplayList.asp?Type=ByVolume&Code=1&Value=C>

APA

Wengström, E. R. (2008). Price competition, level-k theory and communication. Economics Bulletin, 3(66). http://economicsbulletin.vanderbilt.edu/DisplayList.asp?Type=ByVolume&Code=1&Value=C

Vancouver

Wengström ER. Price competition, level-k theory and communication. Economics Bulletin. 2008;3(66).

Author

Wengström, Erik Roland. / Price competition, level-k theory and communication. I: Economics Bulletin. 2008 ; Bind 3, Nr. 66.

Bibtex

@article{fbe86590a19a11dd95e9000ea68e967b,
title = "Price competition, level-k theory and communication",
abstract = "This paper analyzes communication in a price competition game using the level-$k$ theory of bounded rationality. The level-k analysis predicts prices to be higher with communication than without. Our experimental evidence lends support to the view that communication affects subjects in a way that is compatible with the level-k model, indicating that people lie in order to fool other players that they believe do less thinking. Moreover, the results indicate that the predictive power of the level-k model does crucially depend on the possibility for high level players to form homogenous beliefs about the behavior of the level-0 players.",
author = "Wengstr{\"o}m, {Erik Roland}",
year = "2008",
language = "English",
volume = "3",
journal = "Economics Bulletin",
issn = "1545-2921",
publisher = "Economics Bulletin",
number = "66",

}

RIS

TY - JOUR

T1 - Price competition, level-k theory and communication

AU - Wengström, Erik Roland

PY - 2008

Y1 - 2008

N2 - This paper analyzes communication in a price competition game using the level-$k$ theory of bounded rationality. The level-k analysis predicts prices to be higher with communication than without. Our experimental evidence lends support to the view that communication affects subjects in a way that is compatible with the level-k model, indicating that people lie in order to fool other players that they believe do less thinking. Moreover, the results indicate that the predictive power of the level-k model does crucially depend on the possibility for high level players to form homogenous beliefs about the behavior of the level-0 players.

AB - This paper analyzes communication in a price competition game using the level-$k$ theory of bounded rationality. The level-k analysis predicts prices to be higher with communication than without. Our experimental evidence lends support to the view that communication affects subjects in a way that is compatible with the level-k model, indicating that people lie in order to fool other players that they believe do less thinking. Moreover, the results indicate that the predictive power of the level-k model does crucially depend on the possibility for high level players to form homogenous beliefs about the behavior of the level-0 players.

M3 - Journal article

VL - 3

JO - Economics Bulletin

JF - Economics Bulletin

SN - 1545-2921

IS - 66

ER -

ID: 7691351