TY - JOUR

T1 - Participation quorum when voting is costly

AU - Matveenko, Andrei

AU - Valei, Azamat

AU - Vorobyev, Dmitriy

PY - 2022

Y1 - 2022

N2 - Using a pivotal costly voting model of elections, we study how participation quorum require-ments affect voters’ decisions to cast votes, and how they ultimately impact voter and candidatewelfare. We solve the model analytically for the case of three voters and then provide numericalsolutions for larger numbers of voters, and obtain several consistent results. First, we findthat the effect of quorum requirements on voter turnout is non-monotonic and depends onex-ante support for the candidates. When support for the status-quo is low, a stricter quorumrequirement results in higher turnout, while when it is high, the relationship is reversed. Second,we show that a stricter quorum requirement does not necessarily benefit a status quo candidateand can sometimes decrease her chances of winning an election. Third, we characterize optimalquorum requirements from the perspective of voter welfare, and find that, while optimalrequirements vary with support for the candidates, too strict and too lenient requirements canbe very harmful to voter welfare. Therefore, setting moderate quorum requirements close to halfof the number of voters or setting no quorum requirement at all may be reasonable choices.

AB - Using a pivotal costly voting model of elections, we study how participation quorum require-ments affect voters’ decisions to cast votes, and how they ultimately impact voter and candidatewelfare. We solve the model analytically for the case of three voters and then provide numericalsolutions for larger numbers of voters, and obtain several consistent results. First, we findthat the effect of quorum requirements on voter turnout is non-monotonic and depends onex-ante support for the candidates. When support for the status-quo is low, a stricter quorumrequirement results in higher turnout, while when it is high, the relationship is reversed. Second,we show that a stricter quorum requirement does not necessarily benefit a status quo candidateand can sometimes decrease her chances of winning an election. Third, we characterize optimalquorum requirements from the perspective of voter welfare, and find that, while optimalrequirements vary with support for the candidates, too strict and too lenient requirements canbe very harmful to voter welfare. Therefore, setting moderate quorum requirements close to halfof the number of voters or setting no quorum requirement at all may be reasonable choices.

U2 - 10.1016/j.ejpoleco.2021.102126

DO - 10.1016/j.ejpoleco.2021.102126

M3 - Journal article

VL - 73

JO - European Journal of Political Economy

JF - European Journal of Political Economy

SN - 0176-2680

M1 - 102126

ER -