Optimal Monetary Policy Cooperation through State-Independent Contracts with Targets

Publikation: Bidrag til tidsskrift › Tidsskriftartikel › Forskning › fagfællebedømt

Standard

Optimal Monetary Policy Cooperation through State-Independent Contracts with Targets. / Jensen, Henrik.

I: European Economic Review, Bind 44, Nr. 3, 2000, s. 517-539.

Publikation: Bidrag til tidsskrift › Tidsskriftartikel › Forskning › fagfællebedømt

Harvard

Jensen, H 2000, 'Optimal Monetary Policy Cooperation through State-Independent Contracts with Targets', European Economic Review, bind 44, nr. 3, s. 517-539. https://doi.org/10.1016/S0014-2921(98)00086-5

APA

Jensen, H. (2000). Optimal Monetary Policy Cooperation through State-Independent Contracts with Targets. European Economic Review, 44(3), 517-539. https://doi.org/10.1016/S0014-2921(98)00086-5

Vancouver

Jensen H. Optimal Monetary Policy Cooperation through State-Independent Contracts with Targets. European Economic Review. 2000;44(3):517-539. https://doi.org/10.1016/S0014-2921(98)00086-5

Author

Jensen, Henrik. / Optimal Monetary Policy Cooperation through State-Independent Contracts with Targets. I: European Economic Review. 2000 ; Bind 44, Nr. 3. s. 517-539.

Bibtex

@article{3e75412074c611dbbee902004c4f4f50,
title = "Optimal Monetary Policy Cooperation through State-Independent Contracts with Targets",
abstract = "Simple state-independent monetary institutions are shown to secure optimal cooperative policies in a stochastic, linear-quadratic two-country world with international policy spill-overs and national credibility problems. Institutions characterize delegation to independent central bankers facing quadratic performance related contracts punishing or rewarding deviations from primary and intermediate policy targets",
author = "Henrik Jensen",
note = "JEL Classification: E42, E58, F42",
year = "2000",
doi = "10.1016/S0014-2921(98)00086-5",
language = "English",
volume = "44",
pages = "517--539",
journal = "European Economic Review",
issn = "0014-2921",
publisher = "Elsevier",
number = "3",

}

RIS

TY - JOUR

T1 - Optimal Monetary Policy Cooperation through State-Independent Contracts with Targets

AU - Jensen, Henrik

N1 - JEL Classification: E42, E58, F42

PY - 2000

Y1 - 2000

N2 - Simple state-independent monetary institutions are shown to secure optimal cooperative policies in a stochastic, linear-quadratic two-country world with international policy spill-overs and national credibility problems. Institutions characterize delegation to independent central bankers facing quadratic performance related contracts punishing or rewarding deviations from primary and intermediate policy targets

AB - Simple state-independent monetary institutions are shown to secure optimal cooperative policies in a stochastic, linear-quadratic two-country world with international policy spill-overs and national credibility problems. Institutions characterize delegation to independent central bankers facing quadratic performance related contracts punishing or rewarding deviations from primary and intermediate policy targets

U2 - 10.1016/S0014-2921(98)00086-5

DO - 10.1016/S0014-2921(98)00086-5

M3 - Journal article

VL - 44

SP - 517

EP - 539

JO - European Economic Review

JF - European Economic Review

SN - 0014-2921

IS - 3

ER -

ID: 148786