On self-serving strategic beliefs

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On self-serving strategic beliefs. / Ging-Jehli, Nadja R.; Schneider, Florian H.; Weber, Roberto A.

I: Games and Economic Behavior, Bind 122, 07.2020, s. 341-353.

Publikation: Bidrag til tidsskriftTidsskriftartikelForskningfagfællebedømt

Harvard

Ging-Jehli, NR, Schneider, FH & Weber, RA 2020, 'On self-serving strategic beliefs', Games and Economic Behavior, bind 122, s. 341-353. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2020.04.016

APA

Ging-Jehli, N. R., Schneider, F. H., & Weber, R. A. (2020). On self-serving strategic beliefs. Games and Economic Behavior, 122, 341-353. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2020.04.016

Vancouver

Ging-Jehli NR, Schneider FH, Weber RA. On self-serving strategic beliefs. Games and Economic Behavior. 2020 jul.;122:341-353. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2020.04.016

Author

Ging-Jehli, Nadja R. ; Schneider, Florian H. ; Weber, Roberto A. / On self-serving strategic beliefs. I: Games and Economic Behavior. 2020 ; Bind 122. s. 341-353.

Bibtex

@article{a16f8e940e054120a401ea931f333167,
title = "On self-serving strategic beliefs",
abstract = "We experimentally study whether individuals adopt negative beliefs about others' intentions to justify egoistic behavior. Our first study compares the beliefs held by players with such an incentive to the beliefs of neutral observers and finds no evidence that individuals engage in “strategic cynicism.” This contrasts with other recent evidence demonstrating that people hold less positive beliefs about others when doing so allows them to act more self-interestedly. We reconcile the discrepancy, using a simple model of belief manipulation and a novel experiment that replicates and extends the earlier findings. Across three datasets, we find no evidence of negatively biased beliefs in absolute terms. However, those with a greater incentive to view others' intentions cynically exhibit relatively less positive beliefs. Our contribution expands our understanding of the psychological forces underlying self-serving belief manipulation, by noting that strategic cynicism may compete with a tendency towards positivity in determining individuals' beliefs.",
keywords = "Bias, Experiment, Motivated beliefs, Strategic cynicism",
author = "Ging-Jehli, {Nadja R.} and Schneider, {Florian H.} and Weber, {Roberto A.}",
note = "Publisher Copyright: {\textcopyright} 2020 Elsevier Inc.",
year = "2020",
month = jul,
doi = "10.1016/j.geb.2020.04.016",
language = "English",
volume = "122",
pages = "341--353",
journal = "Games and Economic Behavior",
issn = "0899-8256",
publisher = "Academic Press",

}

RIS

TY - JOUR

T1 - On self-serving strategic beliefs

AU - Ging-Jehli, Nadja R.

AU - Schneider, Florian H.

AU - Weber, Roberto A.

N1 - Publisher Copyright: © 2020 Elsevier Inc.

PY - 2020/7

Y1 - 2020/7

N2 - We experimentally study whether individuals adopt negative beliefs about others' intentions to justify egoistic behavior. Our first study compares the beliefs held by players with such an incentive to the beliefs of neutral observers and finds no evidence that individuals engage in “strategic cynicism.” This contrasts with other recent evidence demonstrating that people hold less positive beliefs about others when doing so allows them to act more self-interestedly. We reconcile the discrepancy, using a simple model of belief manipulation and a novel experiment that replicates and extends the earlier findings. Across three datasets, we find no evidence of negatively biased beliefs in absolute terms. However, those with a greater incentive to view others' intentions cynically exhibit relatively less positive beliefs. Our contribution expands our understanding of the psychological forces underlying self-serving belief manipulation, by noting that strategic cynicism may compete with a tendency towards positivity in determining individuals' beliefs.

AB - We experimentally study whether individuals adopt negative beliefs about others' intentions to justify egoistic behavior. Our first study compares the beliefs held by players with such an incentive to the beliefs of neutral observers and finds no evidence that individuals engage in “strategic cynicism.” This contrasts with other recent evidence demonstrating that people hold less positive beliefs about others when doing so allows them to act more self-interestedly. We reconcile the discrepancy, using a simple model of belief manipulation and a novel experiment that replicates and extends the earlier findings. Across three datasets, we find no evidence of negatively biased beliefs in absolute terms. However, those with a greater incentive to view others' intentions cynically exhibit relatively less positive beliefs. Our contribution expands our understanding of the psychological forces underlying self-serving belief manipulation, by noting that strategic cynicism may compete with a tendency towards positivity in determining individuals' beliefs.

KW - Bias

KW - Experiment

KW - Motivated beliefs

KW - Strategic cynicism

UR - http://www.scopus.com/inward/record.url?scp=85085277343&partnerID=8YFLogxK

U2 - 10.1016/j.geb.2020.04.016

DO - 10.1016/j.geb.2020.04.016

M3 - Journal article

AN - SCOPUS:85085277343

VL - 122

SP - 341

EP - 353

JO - Games and Economic Behavior

JF - Games and Economic Behavior

SN - 0899-8256

ER -

ID: 374863359