Monetary policy, delegation and polarization

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Standard

Monetary policy, delegation and polarization. / Schultz, Christian.

I: Economic Journal, Bind 109, Nr. 455, 1999, s. 164-178.

Publikation: Bidrag til tidsskrift › Tidsskriftartikel › Forskning › fagfællebedømt

Harvard

Schultz, C 1999, 'Monetary policy, delegation and polarization', Economic Journal, bind 109, nr. 455, s. 164-178. https://doi.org/10.1111/1468-0297.00425

APA

Schultz, C. (1999). Monetary policy, delegation and polarization. Economic Journal, 109(455), 164-178. https://doi.org/10.1111/1468-0297.00425

Vancouver

Schultz C. Monetary policy, delegation and polarization. Economic Journal. 1999;109(455):164-178. https://doi.org/10.1111/1468-0297.00425

Author

Schultz, Christian. / Monetary policy, delegation and polarization. I: Economic Journal. 1999 ; Bind 109, Nr. 455. s. 164-178.

Bibtex

@article{86db30a074c611dbbee902004c4f4f50,
title = "Monetary policy, delegation and polarization",
abstract = "This paper studies the relation between political polarisation and delegation of stabilisation policy. There is asymmetric information about how the economy works: unlike voters, two political parties know the variance of an employment shock. Prior to an election each party proposes a central banker to be chosen if the party wins. If political polarisation is small, voters will learn the true variance and the central banker and the stabilisation policy are the ones most preferred by the median voter. If the political polarisation is high, stabilisation policy does not reflect the variance but only the preferences of the winning party",
author = "Christian Schultz",
note = "JEL Classification: D72, E32, E58",
year = "1999",
doi = "10.1111/1468-0297.00425",
language = "English",
volume = "109",
pages = "164--178",
journal = "The Economic Journal",
issn = "0013-0133",
publisher = "Wiley",
number = "455",

}

RIS

TY - JOUR

T1 - Monetary policy, delegation and polarization

AU - Schultz, Christian

N1 - JEL Classification: D72, E32, E58

PY - 1999

Y1 - 1999

N2 - This paper studies the relation between political polarisation and delegation of stabilisation policy. There is asymmetric information about how the economy works: unlike voters, two political parties know the variance of an employment shock. Prior to an election each party proposes a central banker to be chosen if the party wins. If political polarisation is small, voters will learn the true variance and the central banker and the stabilisation policy are the ones most preferred by the median voter. If the political polarisation is high, stabilisation policy does not reflect the variance but only the preferences of the winning party

AB - This paper studies the relation between political polarisation and delegation of stabilisation policy. There is asymmetric information about how the economy works: unlike voters, two political parties know the variance of an employment shock. Prior to an election each party proposes a central banker to be chosen if the party wins. If political polarisation is small, voters will learn the true variance and the central banker and the stabilisation policy are the ones most preferred by the median voter. If the political polarisation is high, stabilisation policy does not reflect the variance but only the preferences of the winning party

U2 - 10.1111/1468-0297.00425

DO - 10.1111/1468-0297.00425

M3 - Journal article

VL - 109

SP - 164

EP - 178

JO - The Economic Journal

JF - The Economic Journal

SN - 0013-0133

IS - 455

ER -

ID: 152481