Limit Pricing when incumbents have conflicting interests

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Standard

Limit Pricing when incumbents have conflicting interests. / Schultz, Christian.

I: International Journal of Industrial Organization, Bind 17, Nr. 6, 1999, s. 801-825.

Publikation: Bidrag til tidsskrift › Tidsskriftartikel › Forskning › fagfællebedømt

Harvard

Schultz, C 1999, 'Limit Pricing when incumbents have conflicting interests', International Journal of Industrial Organization, bind 17, nr. 6, s. 801-825. https://doi.org/10.1016/S0167-7187(97)00067-2

APA

Schultz, C. (1999). Limit Pricing when incumbents have conflicting interests. International Journal of Industrial Organization, 17(6), 801-825. https://doi.org/10.1016/S0167-7187(97)00067-2

Vancouver

Schultz C. Limit Pricing when incumbents have conflicting interests. International Journal of Industrial Organization. 1999;17(6):801-825. https://doi.org/10.1016/S0167-7187(97)00067-2

Author

Schultz, Christian. / Limit Pricing when incumbents have conflicting interests. I: International Journal of Industrial Organization. 1999 ; Bind 17, Nr. 6. s. 801-825.

Bibtex

@article{887cf9c074c611dbbee902004c4f4f50,
title = "Limit Pricing when incumbents have conflicting interests",
abstract = "This paper considers entry into a market with two incumbents where one prefers entry and one dislikes it. Unlike the entrant, incumbents know market demand. In separating equilibria incumbents play full information Nash-equilibrium strategies. When beliefs are unprejudiced, separating equilibria only exist if entry is relatively unimportant for an incumbent. In growing markets this condition will tend to be violated so that only pooling equilibria may exist",
author = "Christian Schultz",
note = "JEL Classification: D43, D82",
year = "1999",
doi = "10.1016/S0167-7187(97)00067-2",
language = "English",
volume = "17",
pages = "801--825",
journal = "International Journal of Industrial Organization",
issn = "0167-7187",
publisher = "Elsevier",
number = "6",

}

RIS

TY - JOUR

T1 - Limit Pricing when incumbents have conflicting interests

AU - Schultz, Christian

N1 - JEL Classification: D43, D82

PY - 1999

Y1 - 1999

N2 - This paper considers entry into a market with two incumbents where one prefers entry and one dislikes it. Unlike the entrant, incumbents know market demand. In separating equilibria incumbents play full information Nash-equilibrium strategies. When beliefs are unprejudiced, separating equilibria only exist if entry is relatively unimportant for an incumbent. In growing markets this condition will tend to be violated so that only pooling equilibria may exist

AB - This paper considers entry into a market with two incumbents where one prefers entry and one dislikes it. Unlike the entrant, incumbents know market demand. In separating equilibria incumbents play full information Nash-equilibrium strategies. When beliefs are unprejudiced, separating equilibria only exist if entry is relatively unimportant for an incumbent. In growing markets this condition will tend to be violated so that only pooling equilibria may exist

U2 - 10.1016/S0167-7187(97)00067-2

DO - 10.1016/S0167-7187(97)00067-2

M3 - Journal article

VL - 17

SP - 801

EP - 825

JO - International Journal of Industrial Organization

JF - International Journal of Industrial Organization

SN - 0167-7187

IS - 6

ER -

ID: 152491