Let the experts decide? Asymmetric information, abstention, and coordination in standing committees

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Let the experts decide? Asymmetric information, abstention, and coordination in standing committees. / Morton, Rebecca B.; Tyran, Jean-Robert.

I: Games and Economic Behavior, Bind 72, Nr. 2, 2011, s. 485-509.

Publikation: Bidrag til tidsskrift › Tidsskriftartikel › Forskning › fagfællebedømt

Harvard

Morton, RB & Tyran, J-R 2011, 'Let the experts decide? Asymmetric information, abstention, and coordination in standing committees', Games and Economic Behavior, bind 72, nr. 2, s. 485-509. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2010.09.007

APA

Morton, R. B., & Tyran, J-R. (2011). Let the experts decide? Asymmetric information, abstention, and coordination in standing committees. Games and Economic Behavior, 72(2), 485-509. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2010.09.007

Vancouver

Morton RB, Tyran J-R. Let the experts decide? Asymmetric information, abstention, and coordination in standing committees. Games and Economic Behavior. 2011;72(2):485-509. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2010.09.007

Author

Morton, Rebecca B. ; Tyran, Jean-Robert. / Let the experts decide? Asymmetric information, abstention, and coordination in standing committees. I: Games and Economic Behavior. 2011 ; Bind 72, Nr. 2. s. 485-509.

Bibtex

@article{1ae32d0fcd46491caf18bca30cc60455,
title = "Let the experts decide? Asymmetric information, abstention, and coordination in standing committees",
abstract = " We examine abstention when voters in standing committees are asymmetrically informed and there are multiple pure-strategy equilibria - swing voter's curse (SVC) equilibria where voters with low-quality information abstain and equilibria when all participants vote their information. When the asymmetry in information quality is large, we find that voting groups largely coordinate on the SVC equilibrium which is also Pareto optimal. However, we find that when the asymmetry in information quality is not large and the Pareto optimal equilibrium is for all to participate, significant numbers of voters with low-quality information abstain. Furthermore, we find that information asymmetry induces voters with low-quality information to coordinate on a non-equilibrium outcome. This suggests that coordination on {"}letting the experts{"} decide is a likely voting norm that sometimes validates SVC equilibrium predictions but other times does not.",
keywords = "Information aggregation, Voting, Asymmetric information, Swing voter's curse",
author = "Morton, {Rebecca B.} and Jean-Robert Tyran",
note = "JEL classification: D71, D72, D81, D82",
year = "2011",
doi = "10.1016/j.geb.2010.09.007",
language = "English",
volume = "72",
pages = "485--509",
journal = "Games and Economic Behavior",
issn = "0899-8256",
publisher = "Academic Press",
number = "2",

}

RIS

TY - JOUR

T1 - Let the experts decide? Asymmetric information, abstention, and coordination in standing committees

AU - Morton, Rebecca B.

AU - Tyran, Jean-Robert

N1 - JEL classification: D71, D72, D81, D82

PY - 2011

Y1 - 2011

N2 - We examine abstention when voters in standing committees are asymmetrically informed and there are multiple pure-strategy equilibria - swing voter's curse (SVC) equilibria where voters with low-quality information abstain and equilibria when all participants vote their information. When the asymmetry in information quality is large, we find that voting groups largely coordinate on the SVC equilibrium which is also Pareto optimal. However, we find that when the asymmetry in information quality is not large and the Pareto optimal equilibrium is for all to participate, significant numbers of voters with low-quality information abstain. Furthermore, we find that information asymmetry induces voters with low-quality information to coordinate on a non-equilibrium outcome. This suggests that coordination on "letting the experts" decide is a likely voting norm that sometimes validates SVC equilibrium predictions but other times does not.

AB - We examine abstention when voters in standing committees are asymmetrically informed and there are multiple pure-strategy equilibria - swing voter's curse (SVC) equilibria where voters with low-quality information abstain and equilibria when all participants vote their information. When the asymmetry in information quality is large, we find that voting groups largely coordinate on the SVC equilibrium which is also Pareto optimal. However, we find that when the asymmetry in information quality is not large and the Pareto optimal equilibrium is for all to participate, significant numbers of voters with low-quality information abstain. Furthermore, we find that information asymmetry induces voters with low-quality information to coordinate on a non-equilibrium outcome. This suggests that coordination on "letting the experts" decide is a likely voting norm that sometimes validates SVC equilibrium predictions but other times does not.

KW - Information aggregation

KW - Voting

KW - Asymmetric information

KW - Swing voter's curse

U2 - 10.1016/j.geb.2010.09.007

DO - 10.1016/j.geb.2010.09.007

M3 - Journal article

VL - 72

SP - 485

EP - 509

JO - Games and Economic Behavior

JF - Games and Economic Behavior

SN - 0899-8256

IS - 2

ER -

ID: 33515115