TY - JOUR

T1 - Information, polarization and term length in democracy

AU - Schultz, Christian

N1 - JEL classification: D72, H1, H7, K4

PY - 2008

Y1 - 2008

N2 - This paper considers term lengths in a representative democracy where the political issue divides the population on the left-right scale. Parties are ideologically different and better informed about the consequences of policies than voters are. A short term length makes the government more accountable, but the re-election incentive leads to policy-distortion as the government seeks to manipulate swing voters' beliefs to make its ideology more popular. This creates a trade-off: A short term length improves accountability but gives distortions. A short term length is best for swing voters when the uncertainty is large and parties are not very polarized. Partisan voters always prefer a long term length. When politicians learn while in office a long term length becomes more attractive for swing voters.

AB - This paper considers term lengths in a representative democracy where the political issue divides the population on the left-right scale. Parties are ideologically different and better informed about the consequences of policies than voters are. A short term length makes the government more accountable, but the re-election incentive leads to policy-distortion as the government seeks to manipulate swing voters' beliefs to make its ideology more popular. This creates a trade-off: A short term length improves accountability but gives distortions. A short term length is best for swing voters when the uncertainty is large and parties are not very polarized. Partisan voters always prefer a long term length. When politicians learn while in office a long term length becomes more attractive for swing voters.

U2 - 10.1016/j.jpubeco.2007.12.008

DO - 10.1016/j.jpubeco.2007.12.008

M3 - Journal article

VL - 92

SP - 1078

EP - 1091

JO - Journal of Public Economics

JF - Journal of Public Economics

SN - 0047-2727

IS - 5-6

ER -