Incentive contracts with unobservable competence levels

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Standard

Incentive contracts with unobservable competence levels. / Davis, Jerome; Keiding, Hans.

I: Open Economics Journal, Bind 1, 2008, s. 47-54.

Publikation: Bidrag til tidsskrift › Tidsskriftartikel › Forskning › fagfællebedømt

Harvard

Davis, J & Keiding, H 2008, 'Incentive contracts with unobservable competence levels', Open Economics Journal, bind 1, s. 47-54. https://doi.org/10.2174/1874919400801010047

APA

Davis, J., & Keiding, H. (2008). Incentive contracts with unobservable competence levels. Open Economics Journal, 1, 47-54. https://doi.org/10.2174/1874919400801010047

Vancouver

Davis J, Keiding H. Incentive contracts with unobservable competence levels. Open Economics Journal. 2008;1:47-54. https://doi.org/10.2174/1874919400801010047

Author

Davis, Jerome ; Keiding, Hans. / Incentive contracts with unobservable competence levels. I: Open Economics Journal. 2008 ; Bind 1. s. 47-54.

Bibtex

@article{e5530300855511dd81b0000ea68e967b,
title = "Incentive contracts with unobservable competence levels",
abstract = "A contract where the agent is compensated ex post only upon satisfactory performance, often called a no-cureno- pay contract, can arise as under several circumstances. In this paper, we model the problem of contractual choice as a principal-agent contract which is modified due to hidden information about the competence of the agent to fulfill the obligations of the contract. The agent offers a choice of contracts to the principal, thereby signalling agent competence to the principal, and there is no alternative reputation mechanism to the contract for the principal's bargaining strategy. It turns out that in this situation, the optimal contract will have a form which may be recognized as a no-cure-no-pay contract.",
author = "Jerome Davis and Hans Keiding",
year = "2008",
doi = "10.2174/1874919400801010047",
language = "English",
volume = "1",
pages = "47--54",
journal = "The Open Economics Journal",
issn = "1874-9194",
publisher = "Bentham Open",

}

RIS

TY - JOUR

T1 - Incentive contracts with unobservable competence levels

AU - Davis, Jerome

AU - Keiding, Hans

PY - 2008

Y1 - 2008

N2 - A contract where the agent is compensated ex post only upon satisfactory performance, often called a no-cureno- pay contract, can arise as under several circumstances. In this paper, we model the problem of contractual choice as a principal-agent contract which is modified due to hidden information about the competence of the agent to fulfill the obligations of the contract. The agent offers a choice of contracts to the principal, thereby signalling agent competence to the principal, and there is no alternative reputation mechanism to the contract for the principal's bargaining strategy. It turns out that in this situation, the optimal contract will have a form which may be recognized as a no-cure-no-pay contract.

AB - A contract where the agent is compensated ex post only upon satisfactory performance, often called a no-cureno- pay contract, can arise as under several circumstances. In this paper, we model the problem of contractual choice as a principal-agent contract which is modified due to hidden information about the competence of the agent to fulfill the obligations of the contract. The agent offers a choice of contracts to the principal, thereby signalling agent competence to the principal, and there is no alternative reputation mechanism to the contract for the principal's bargaining strategy. It turns out that in this situation, the optimal contract will have a form which may be recognized as a no-cure-no-pay contract.

U2 - 10.2174/1874919400801010047

DO - 10.2174/1874919400801010047

M3 - Journal article

VL - 1

SP - 47

EP - 54

JO - The Open Economics Journal

JF - The Open Economics Journal

SN - 1874-9194

ER -

ID: 6109132