Give and Take in Dictator Games

Publikation: Working paper › Forskning

Standard

Give and Take in Dictator Games. / Cappelen, Alexander W.; Nielsen, Ulrik; Sorensen, Erik; Tungodden, Bertil; Tyran, Jean-Robert.

2012.

Publikation: Working paper › Forskning

Harvard

Cappelen, AW, Nielsen, U, Sorensen, E, Tungodden, B & Tyran, J-R 2012 'Give and Take in Dictator Games'. https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2122306

APA

Cappelen, A. W., Nielsen, U., Sorensen, E., Tungodden, B., & Tyran, J-R. (2012). Give and Take in Dictator Games. Univ. of Copenhagen Dept. of Economics Discussion Paper Nr. 12-05 https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2122306

Vancouver

Cappelen AW, Nielsen U, Sorensen E, Tungodden B, Tyran J-R. Give and Take in Dictator Games. 2012 aug. 2. https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2122306

Author

Cappelen, Alexander W. ; Nielsen, Ulrik ; Sorensen, Erik ; Tungodden, Bertil ; Tyran, Jean-Robert. / Give and Take in Dictator Games. 2012. (Univ. of Copenhagen Dept. of Economics Discussion Paper; Nr. 12-05).

Bibtex

@techreport{5193bd76ac4c43eaaaf1e5c908c73360,
title = "Give and Take in Dictator Games",
abstract = "It has been shown that participants in the dictator game are less willing to give money to the other participant when their choice set also includes the option to take money. We examine whether this effect is due to the choice set providing a signal about entitlements in a setting where entitlements initially may be considered unclear. We find that the share of positive transfers depends on the choice set even when there is no uncertainty about entitlements, and that this choice-set effect is robust across a heterogeneous group of participants recruited from the general adult population in Denmark. The findings are consistent with dictator giving partly being motivated by a desire to signal that one is not entirely selfish or by a desire to follow a social norm that is choice-set dependent.",
keywords = "dictator game, choice set, social preferences, experiments",
author = "Cappelen, {Alexander W.} and Ulrik Nielsen and Erik Sorensen and Bertil Tungodden and Jean-Robert Tyran",
year = "2012",
month = aug,
day = "2",
doi = "10.2139/ssrn.2122306",
language = "English",
series = "Univ. of Copenhagen Dept. of Economics Discussion Paper",
number = "12-05",
type = "WorkingPaper",

}

RIS

TY - UNPB

T1 - Give and Take in Dictator Games

AU - Cappelen, Alexander W.

AU - Nielsen, Ulrik

AU - Sorensen, Erik

AU - Tungodden, Bertil

AU - Tyran, Jean-Robert

PY - 2012/8/2

Y1 - 2012/8/2

N2 - It has been shown that participants in the dictator game are less willing to give money to the other participant when their choice set also includes the option to take money. We examine whether this effect is due to the choice set providing a signal about entitlements in a setting where entitlements initially may be considered unclear. We find that the share of positive transfers depends on the choice set even when there is no uncertainty about entitlements, and that this choice-set effect is robust across a heterogeneous group of participants recruited from the general adult population in Denmark. The findings are consistent with dictator giving partly being motivated by a desire to signal that one is not entirely selfish or by a desire to follow a social norm that is choice-set dependent.

AB - It has been shown that participants in the dictator game are less willing to give money to the other participant when their choice set also includes the option to take money. We examine whether this effect is due to the choice set providing a signal about entitlements in a setting where entitlements initially may be considered unclear. We find that the share of positive transfers depends on the choice set even when there is no uncertainty about entitlements, and that this choice-set effect is robust across a heterogeneous group of participants recruited from the general adult population in Denmark. The findings are consistent with dictator giving partly being motivated by a desire to signal that one is not entirely selfish or by a desire to follow a social norm that is choice-set dependent.

KW - dictator game

KW - choice set

KW - social preferences

KW - experiments

U2 - 10.2139/ssrn.2122306

DO - 10.2139/ssrn.2122306

M3 - Working paper

T3 - Univ. of Copenhagen Dept. of Economics Discussion Paper

BT - Give and Take in Dictator Games

ER -

ID: 241647569