Free Riding and Workplace Democracy – Heterogeneous Task Preferences and Sorting

Publikation: Working paperForskning

A novel laboratory experiment is used to show that mismatching between task preferences and task assignment undermines worker productivity and leads to free riding in teams. We elicit task preferences from all workers. Workers’ endogenous sorting into tasks significantly improves productivity under individual-based remuneration (performance pay). Under team-based remuneration (revenue sharing), free riding is significant, but almost exclusively among those working on undesired tasks. Task selection by majority voting in teams alleviates free riding, but only partly so, because some workers are still assigned to undesired tasks. Our findings have broad implications for research using real effort tasks.
Antal sider60
StatusUdgivet - sep. 2019
NavnUniversity of Copenhagen. Institute of Economics. Discussion Papers (Online)


  • free riding, team, workplace democracy, experiment, real effort

ID: 248552043