Fictitious play in extensive form games

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This article analyzes the fictitious play process originally proposed for strategic form games by Brown (1951) and Robinson (1951). We interpret the process as a model of preplay thinking performed by players before acting in a one-shot game. This model is one of bounded rationality. We discuss how fictitious play should then be defined for extensive form games and conclude that this is somewhat problematic. We therefore study two alternative definitions. For either of these, under a weak condition of initial uncertainty, a convergence point of a fictitious play sequence is a sequential equilibrium. For generic games of perfect information initial uncertainty also implies convergence of fictitious play
TidsskriftGames and Economic Behavior
Udgave nummer2
Sider (fra-til)177-202
StatusUdgivet - 1996

Bibliografisk note

JEL Classification: C72

ID: 3047517