Elite Capture of Foreign Aid: Evidence from Offshore Bank Accounts

Publikation: Bidrag til tidsskriftTidsskriftartikelForskningfagfællebedømt

Standard

Elite Capture of Foreign Aid : Evidence from Offshore Bank Accounts. / Andersen, Jørgen Juel; Johannesen, Niels; Rijkers, Bob.

I: Journal of Political Economy, Bind 130, Nr. 2, 2022, s. 388-425.

Publikation: Bidrag til tidsskriftTidsskriftartikelForskningfagfællebedømt

Harvard

Andersen, JJ, Johannesen, N & Rijkers, B 2022, 'Elite Capture of Foreign Aid: Evidence from Offshore Bank Accounts', Journal of Political Economy, bind 130, nr. 2, s. 388-425. https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3551078, https://doi.org/10.1086/717455

APA

Andersen, J. J., Johannesen, N., & Rijkers, B. (2022). Elite Capture of Foreign Aid: Evidence from Offshore Bank Accounts. Journal of Political Economy, 130(2), 388-425. https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3551078, https://doi.org/10.1086/717455

Vancouver

Andersen JJ, Johannesen N, Rijkers B. Elite Capture of Foreign Aid: Evidence from Offshore Bank Accounts. Journal of Political Economy. 2022;130(2):388-425. https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3551078, https://doi.org/10.1086/717455

Author

Andersen, Jørgen Juel ; Johannesen, Niels ; Rijkers, Bob. / Elite Capture of Foreign Aid : Evidence from Offshore Bank Accounts. I: Journal of Political Economy. 2022 ; Bind 130, Nr. 2. s. 388-425.

Bibtex

@article{71a5457a658a499ca3e00ca83c284966,
title = "Elite Capture of Foreign Aid: Evidence from Offshore Bank Accounts",
abstract = "Do elites capture foreign aid? This paper documents that aid disbursements to highly aid-dependent countries coincide with sharp increases in bank deposits in offshore financial centers known for bank secrecy and private wealth management but not in other financial centers. The estimates are not confounded by contemporaneous shocks—such as civil conflicts, natural disasters, and financial crises—and are robust to instrumenting using predetermined aid commitments. The implied leakage rate is around 7.5% at the sample mean and tends to increase with the ratio of aid to GDP. The findings are consistent with aid capture in the most aid-dependent countries.",
author = "Andersen, {J{\o}rgen Juel} and Niels Johannesen and Bob Rijkers",
year = "2022",
doi = "10.2139/ssrn.3551078",
language = "English",
volume = "130",
pages = "388--425",
journal = "Journal of Political Economy",
issn = "0022-3808",
publisher = "University of Chicago Press",
number = "2",

}

RIS

TY - JOUR

T1 - Elite Capture of Foreign Aid

T2 - Evidence from Offshore Bank Accounts

AU - Andersen, Jørgen Juel

AU - Johannesen, Niels

AU - Rijkers, Bob

PY - 2022

Y1 - 2022

N2 - Do elites capture foreign aid? This paper documents that aid disbursements to highly aid-dependent countries coincide with sharp increases in bank deposits in offshore financial centers known for bank secrecy and private wealth management but not in other financial centers. The estimates are not confounded by contemporaneous shocks—such as civil conflicts, natural disasters, and financial crises—and are robust to instrumenting using predetermined aid commitments. The implied leakage rate is around 7.5% at the sample mean and tends to increase with the ratio of aid to GDP. The findings are consistent with aid capture in the most aid-dependent countries.

AB - Do elites capture foreign aid? This paper documents that aid disbursements to highly aid-dependent countries coincide with sharp increases in bank deposits in offshore financial centers known for bank secrecy and private wealth management but not in other financial centers. The estimates are not confounded by contemporaneous shocks—such as civil conflicts, natural disasters, and financial crises—and are robust to instrumenting using predetermined aid commitments. The implied leakage rate is around 7.5% at the sample mean and tends to increase with the ratio of aid to GDP. The findings are consistent with aid capture in the most aid-dependent countries.

U2 - 10.2139/ssrn.3551078

DO - 10.2139/ssrn.3551078

M3 - Journal article

VL - 130

SP - 388

EP - 425

JO - Journal of Political Economy

JF - Journal of Political Economy

SN - 0022-3808

IS - 2

ER -

ID: 288342118